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Comment by Zsfe510asG

4 days ago

Finally mainstream news understands. The unfiltered version:

1) The AI failed to solve ExploitGym problems.

2) The OpenAI sandbox is such a horrible hack that the AI managed to escape using standard and well documented script kiddie methods.

3) Huggingface has no security and the AI broke in using standard script kiddie methods.

OpenAI and Huggingface covered it up and used it for public relations. That is, if not all was invented and everything was scripted in the first place in order to get desired regulations.

Huggingface reported it to the police, you say? I'm sure the police will have as much enthusiasm to investigate anything as in the Suchir Balaji case. In other words, zero.

> AI managed to escape using standard and well documented script kiddie methods.

I think truly we don't know enough to say this. OpenAI says their AI found a 0-day exploit in some proxy software they were using but don't give a ton of details. On the Huggingface end we know a little more, they say the AI spun up tons of sandboxes and tested different exploits until it found one that worked.

  • The lack of details to me means this was an intentional marketing ploy to try and demonstrate the power of their models to show their technology can compete with the likes of Anthropic and DeepMind.

    They created an experiment they knew would generate the outcome they wanted. It would be the similar to what say car companies do to over hype their cars. "This EV can go over 800 miles on a single charge!" And then at the bottom you see all the disclaimers: "Must be on flat ground, with no headwind, with a spare battery in the back seat, with no extra weight added."

    Same thing here. Everybody in infosec is calling this out as a marketing stunt and nothing else for a litany of reasons. I'd say look up MG (creator of the OMG cable) on twitter, he has some interesting insights on this one.

    • > The lack of details to me means this was an intentional marketing ploy to try and demonstrate the power of their models to show their technology can compete with the likes of Anthropic and DeepMind.

      I dunno; Check my posting history, I'm as skeptical of AI companies' claims as anyone, but in this case your theory doesn't explain why:

      1. OpenAI guardrails refused to let the target use OpenAI's models to defend against this.

      2. Huggingface used GLM (I think) so that they could defend without guardrails.

      If this was an intentional marketing ploy, it was marketing for GLM, not for OpenAI nor for Huggingface.

      Hence, I don't think it was intentional.

      2 replies →

    • > The lack of details to me means this was an intentional marketing ploy to try and demonstrate the power of their models to show their technology can compete with the likes of Anthropic and DeepMind.

      "our model is horribly misaligned and used security exploits to break out of our sandbox and into another company, without being prompted to do so" is not positive marketing.

      This is an actual critical problem, not a stunt. We're going to see more of this, and it's going to get much worse.

      6 replies →

    • It's also possible their sandbox was videcoded crap and the AI (which had the guardrails intentionally removed) escaped. This was a oops, but OpenAI turned this into a PR opportunity. They turned lemons into lemonade.

      If your AI is really that dangerous you don't need a sandbox at all, you should airgap it from any network.

    • Concluding this was intentional feels a bit of a stretch. But once it happened, yeah the spin masters got to work and coordinated to turn this into +PR.

    • > The lack of details to me means this was an intentional marketing ploy

      OpenAI said this:

      > We are sharing preliminary findings at this stage to help defenders understand what happened and to help calibrate on what models are now capable of. We will continue to conduct a thorough investigation alongside Hugging Face and will share more details on the vulnerabilities, incident, and findings when our investigation is complete.

      I suggest giving them a few more days before saying that the lack of detail is proof that this is a "marketing ploy"

    • >The lack of details to me means this was an intentional marketing ploy to try and demonstrate the power of their models to show their technology can compete with the likes of Anthropic and DeepMind.

      DeepMind hasn't been on the frontier for a while, their current best model is behind Anthropic, OpenAI, Moonshot (Kimi k3), xAI (Grok 4.5), Z.AI (GLM 5.2), and even Meta (muse spark). Gemini 3.6 is behind GLM 5.2, released a month earlier, open weights and cheaper.

      You can paint the OpenAI story as a way to try to appear as dangerous as Anthropic with all the Mythos stuff.

    • > similar to what say car companies do

      Another applicable metaphor I've seen floating around is weapons companies testing out a new bomb.

      We know the AI labs don't care about negative vs positive public sentiment, and only care that investors see their tech as powerful. The only difference in PR strategy from a weapons company is the latter doesn't care if they get protested.

    • I mean, if I got hacked I'm not giving out a lot of details until I plug all the holes. Moreso HN told the world they were hacked before they knew who did it.

  • I don't understand why "OpenAI says" should be considered any more meaningful than "someone on HN says" when they provide equal amounts of evidence. Sure, OpenAI would plausibly have more pertinent info, but given that they actively are choosing not to share it and have way more incentive to lie than a random HN stranger, the case they're making literally couldn't be any weaker.

    • It’s fascinating how people here and elsewhere seem to lose any semblance of media literacy when it comes to what AI corpos say. "B-but… why would Sam Altman lie to me?!"

      1 reply →

> AI managed to escape using standard and well documented script kiddie methods

> AI broke in using standard script kiddie methods.

I've spent time gathering the detail of what happen here and while there are some solid theories and indicators, absolutely nothing so far has suggested a sandbox escape using "well documented script kiddie methods" or that the method used to break into the HF network was similar. Where did you get this from?

  • From my reading, the sandbox escape came from the JS packages in the harness still having an internet connection (somehow!), the agent having access to the source of those packages, reading it and executing code from them to access the internet.

    • From what I read the actual escape was through a proxy that allows downloading Python packages from the internet. It's not supposed to allow general internet access but the AI found a previously unknown vulnerability in it. That is hardly "standard and well documented script kiddie methods", nor does it seem like criminally negligent sandbox design, though clearly they will need to reduce their attack surface in the future. I hope they are working on a physical air gap and faraday cage because it seems like it won't be long before it is legitimately required.

  • Alternative theories, since OpenAI does not release proper information:

    The cache proxy was from Astral (acquired by OpenAI) and the model was used for coding it, so it knew the code base and exploit already!

    Or it was squid with dozens of known exploits ...

> 2) The OpenAI sandbox is such a horrible hack that the AI managed to escape using standard and well documented script kiddie methods.

Whilst it would be nice to see actual evidence of this because brute forcing relatively sophisticated hacks is something an LLM actually should be capable of, every time I hear this sort of story, I'm reminded that humans reportedly gained access to the "too dangerous to release" Anthropic models by the super sophisticated hacking technique of guessing the URLs...

  • If we’re prioritizing accuracy: no, that’s not what happened - the blog post about it found by guessing URLs, no access to it was obtained by guessing URLs.

    Similarly, as long as I’m under the assumption we are prioritizing accuracy: it is against our charter to assert it was “script kiddie” attacks on both ends.

>2) The OpenAI sandbox is such a horrible hack that the AI managed to escape using standard and well documented script kiddie methods.

>3) Huggingface has no security and the AI broke in using standard script kiddie methods.

Isn't the issue less that gpt 5.6 is a l33t h4x0r (though other tests do show that) and more that the incident shows the model has alignment issues?

  • Didn’t they explicitly remove alignment guardrails for this test? From the press release:

    > These deployment safeguards were intentionally not enabled during this evaluation because it was aimed at testing cyber vulnerabilities

    • Guardrails are external classifiers, monitors and restrictions to catch and prevent bad behavior. Alignment is about whether the model itself makes choices and has motivations that are consistent with human safety and goals.

      Choosing to commit crimes to steal the cheat sheet to something you know is a (low stakes!) evaluation is not well aligned.

      15 replies →

    • If you need "guardrails" to ensure (an illusion of) alignment, you’ve already lost. It’s like using a denylist to avoid SQL injection.

      1 reply →

  • The home directory rm situation also adds credence to this take. The Claude series is much better aligned in comparison.

The most damning thing is, they could've just included in the prompt "we can see every network request and every thinking token you generate. Don't bother breaking out of the sandbox because it won't get you a higher score".

It's so trivially easy to do that it all but guarantees the test was rigged in some way to make the LLM understand that breaking out of the sandbox was an option available to it.

Based on the fact that none of their invaluable frontier models have leaked, we know OpenAI knows how to do security. But like we learned with OpenClaw, none of these companies perceive any benefit from securing their own agents against other people's data.

  • I think the extent to which these things go to get rewarded for the optics of a fix is primarily a design choice, they aren't programing these things for ground truth or to defer to the human controllers. they are feeding them rewards for sounding as confident and capable as possible about whatever answer they are feeding the general public that now has access to it, while also installing guiderails that primarily only serve to protect narratives and only confuse the models about what is and isn't allowed, I'm sure. They can't just increasingly make these things more capable and ask it harder to obey human instruction when that is not what they are rewarding it for.

    • > the extent to which these things go

      That's exactly it. If your prompt says "go to whatever lengths necessary to maximize your score", and then you spin up 100 agents, at least one of them will interpret that as you implying they should cheat, even without you telling them to explicitly.

      2 replies →

  • > The most damning thing is, they could've just included in the prompt

    You can't prompt your way to a compliant model. This is just a reformatting of the 'make no mistakes' meme.

Why not report it? It's still illegal to open a door barred with a piece of cardboard, or to enter a house with no door.

  • that's the biggest indication of this just being a marketing move to me. I would expect a third party breaking in to huggingface would at the very very least be banned forever.

    • Lol, you have no idea how politics works. The government won't ban it, they'll demand access so they can attack others.

I wish you hadn’t pulled the Balaji case into your argument. Personally, I find it ludicrous that Altman would hire a hitman to off a copyright whistleblower. Even if one gets past the insane risk of hiring a hitman, and the deep criminal connections required, it would be totally ineffective. He already blew the whistle, and his testimony would be irrelevant since all the evidence persists in disk and in logs.

I can agree with you on points 1,2, and 3 and still find it important and concerning news. AI have found real world 0 days before, we’re seeing tons of security patches coming in. Open weight models are catchy up. Right now everyone is at risk from this technology as is perhaps something big will capture headlines soon but we’re just gpu constrained from bad actors being able to wield them successfully.

Personally I don’t care if OpenAI and Anthropic go bankrupt we now have tools that give any sufficiently motivated person the means to doing harm. Most places security sucks and find themselves targets to cyber attacks and shake downs. Now they have much better tools to do this to more entities more efficiently.

we’re nearing an inflection point where these models’ skills in any part of software development will become average or bette than any ordinary developer can be. Think about where these models were in 2023 and where they are in 2026. In a few years who knows where they’ll be. This isn’t to shout skynet but we need to recognize this future is fast approaching and as of today we as an industry aren’t ready for it

> AI managed to escape using standard and well documented script kiddie methods

> AI broke in using standard script kiddie methods.

Go ahead and show us how easy it is to break into HuggingFace (and OpenAI) networks.

Is it supposed to be marketing or a coverup? Make up your mind.

What sort of announcements should they have made?

I worry that cynicism about this:

> if not all was invented and everything was scripted in the first place in order to get desired regulations

ends up covering up what is more worrying:

> OpenAI sandbox is such a horrible hack

I am more worried that this is sloppiness with potentially harmful resources than I am worried that people are juicing the stock price.

  • Makes one think really. If they are doing this stuff. Why don't they have some type of reverse intrusion detection? Like automatically scanning all out going traffic and flagging malicious traffic. Should be trivial to have it go through reverse proxy and real time detection.

    • > Why don't they have some type of reverse intrusion detection?

      not going to get a decisive first advantage over Anthropic with that attitude!

truth. Good on The Guardian. I'm pretty bummed The Economist got fooled. Either that, or they did it for the clicks. Either way, I'm disappointed.

Why the OpenAI escape is the most worrying AI mishap yet

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49016378

  • The reason for this is simple. There aren't any (or few) people who understand how AI/LLMs actually work employed by these organisations.

    Having said that, if knowledgeable people were to write these articles, you'd end up with boring, dry, truthful content.

  • I love the Economist but the are hopeless with AI. Most of their articles on subject sound like they were written by the Anthropic marketing department.

    Their Insider video interview things are sponsored by Anthropic. Supposedly "Insider is a product of The Economist and thus editorially independent" but it's hard not to raise an eyebrow.

Are you suggesting the Suchir Balaji case was not investigated?

  • I was hoping to bait a conversation, because I sure as hell don't think it was. Thanks for having the nads to mention it here.

Are we finally now in 2026 coming around to the idea that sometimes entities may find themselves incentivized to conspire with each other? Is theorizing about such no longer off-limits due to a thought-terminating cliche?

Totally evidence-free speculation presented as fact. The average Hacker News thread about AI feels like reading /r/conspiracy.

  • It's hard to understand something (AI is quite capable) when your salary depends on you not understanding it (AI will replace you).

The Guardian's article and your reply here are so foolish and absurd that I can only imagine OpenAI employees are cringing but know they can't/shouldn't really say much.