Comment by simoncion

> It's like in-band signalling in the telephone network...

The major LLM providers claim that they are very committed to security and that their products are very dangerous and capable of great harm.

Given that their tools do what Ma Bell's systems did in the mid-1900s, [0] -which the entire software world relearned was a terrible idea by the early 1990s- they are definitely

1) Lying about the extent of their commitment to security

2) Lying about the extent of the harm that their tools are capable of

3) Both

My money is on #3.

Because of the fact that -in the absence of unambiguous laws that require meaningfully-severe punishment- even the most fucknasty and amateur hour security failures nearly always have little to no impact on the company that causes them, the major LLM providers have absolutely done the smart thing by providing commercial tools that have remote code execution vulns that would automatically give them a Critical CVSS score.

To put it another way: "the market" has no idea how to evaluate computer security claims. Because of this, every dollar you spend on proactively fixing security problems is nearly always a dollar wasted... it's better to wait until someone important gets Big Mad before spending the money. Does this make the world worse? Absolutely! Does this make companies selling software and software services much more money? Definitely!

[0] If the major LLM providers did separate unsanitized data from program instructions and ensure that the two are never mixed, things like [1] would not be possible.

[1] <https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/08/prompt-inject...>