Comment by slopinthebag
9 hours ago
This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The question is if a sufficiently abstract description of that processing captures everything physically constitutive of consciousness. How would you support your position that it does?
It's really the only live option once the issues are properly understood. Causal closure: a physical event is explanatorily exhausted by prior physical events. Causal exclusion: if physical properties fully cause/explain everything we say and do about consciousness, i.e. our behavior purported to be about consciousness, then consciousness cannot be distinct from the physical behavior and also be a cause of that behavior. For example, for our speech acts to be about consciousness, consciousness must be causally involved in their generation. Hence, consciousness is a second-order physical property of the same category as the information carried by the speech acts about consciousness. That is, consciousness is an abstract property of physical organization.
It's a massive leap to go from consciousness must be causally integrated with physical brain activity to consciousness is exhausted by an abstract functional description of that activity. At best you could establish that consciousness cannot be an additional, independent cause outside the physical causal order.