Comment by xoa
2 days ago
It's hard to give a big enough :rolleyes: for this nihilistic bullshit being spouted in 2026. In fact I'm going to go further: I accuse you lrvick of active maliciousness and trying to aid illicit access and discourage people from improving their security, because you have no excuse not to know better.
>All they would need to do is install a wrapper for sesame that waits for the next database unlock and exfiltrates all passwords in plain text to a pastebin somewhere.
"""All""" they need is to get root? Most people access all key stuff on their own devices, and for the vast ultra super majority of the population and vital sites if their personal trusted device is rooted it's over regardless. Your "Now as an attacker if I want to get the users whole database of 100 passwords I must trick them to tapping a blinking smartcard or touchid 100 times" is total fucking make believe, completely ignoring normal things like RECOVERY FLOWS. If you have root on someone's computer and phone you have access to their email and probably messaging as well, and that will suffice to get into nearly everything including the majority of financial institutions (which even now have massive ones that don't even support HSMs at all, let alone leave no recovery route! looking at you Charles Schwab, with total client assets in excess of $12.5 trillion at the start of this year [0]). There isn't any need for "100 times" because most people don't have 100 different critical accounts, rather single digits or even just one actual one that has things like money or comms.
>This is how I have been doing password management for over a decade with password store, the standard unix password manager. That tiny shell script is the -minimum- security any password manager must have.
Literally laughing out loud here. If it's not easy enough for my friends in their 70s to use and like it's WORTHLESS to most security. Including on some level mine or yours, because security has key social/network effects beyond just individuals, stolen money, information, and access is used to fuel further security threats. Job #1 is to make something people like and works with most of what already exists. Otherwise it's yet another case of "ROTATE PASSWORDS EVERY 2 MONTHS NO USE X NUMBERS OH ALSO Y SPECIAL CHARACTERS NO NOT LIKE THAT" which results in everyone just leaving stuff on sticky notes on their screens and doing the bare minimum to fool the system and using the same thing or minor variants everywhere. Theorycrafted garbage made for robots not humans.
>I submit with a straight face that they have never let any capable security engineers near their products. They have a negligent design end to end and must not be replicated.
I submit with a straight face you are either literally working for a hostile agency to spread disinformation or you have serious neurodivergence or you are seriously and dangerously bubbled with an (un)healthy splash of Dunning-Kruger mixed in.
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0: https://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-releases/press-relea...
Who needs root? You seem to be under the impression the status quo password managers are reasonably secure for anyone, technical or otherwise.
Exfiltrate all plaintext credentials from 1password:
op list items \
Exfiltrate all plaintext credentials from lastpass:
lpass ls \
Stick one of those in a dependency of a dependency of a dependency of a popular NPM package and you can get access to developer accounts at every sector of the tech industry.
Super easy to avoid with minimal change to user experience, and yet no one did because "no one else does".
Except for Mooltipass and Password Store, which unfortunately no one has heard of. It is the popular options with billions of dollars not doing the basics the niche open source ones do that is so unforgivable.
I just wish to not see others repeating those mistakes and putting users at increased risk for no reason. I know someone personally who had their savings account wiped out because malware dumped their lastpass database. A malicious browser plugin to sniff the master password is all it takes without a hardware anchor.
You have to both install and explicitly enable the 1Password CLI, both steps no “normal” user is going to take unless socially engineered to.
https://www.1password.dev/cli/get-started
And getting secrets using it requires explicit authentication with password/fingerprint/etc (I forget if it’s per item or per process, but still).
Those are of course just minimum viable proofs of concept for users with the CLI installed because they are succinct. Real malware could of course install the CLIs for the user helpfully or just directly access the database the next time it is unlocked and dump everything just as easily. A malicious browser plugin to dump the master password to bulk decrypt works just as well.
Decrypting -all- passwords any time you decrypt -any- password under the hood is an irresponsible design for a password manager, especially on modern hardware with so so so many other options that enforce rate limiting, hardware anchored encryption, and physical user consent.
Performative 2FA for every secret like 1password does when the binary has direct access to bulk decrypt all secrets in plain text with a key in system memory is a very strange choice given you could just have the hardware doing the individual decryption for a single secret instead of exposing the secrets that can bulk decrypt the whole database.
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While figuring out how to set up credential management for AI, I discovered 1Password CLI, and it terrifies me how it requires giving full account access for 10 minutes to the entire terminal! They seem to think the terminal environment should be treated the same as an app running with macOS protections, and that it's expected user experience to match how the GUI app operates. [1] I think that posture is wildly irresponsible, and that the 1Password GUI authorization dialog should specify and allow access only once to the items requested from CLI.
I don't understand why anyone would use LastPass. [2]
[1] https://www.1password.community/developers-69/security-conce... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LastPass#Security_incidents
Sticky notes is probably absolutely fine security wise if you’re not in an office/shared space.
The problem with sticky notes isn't that you have a physical note with your password - it's that the main benefits of a password manager are a) giving you long, complex passwords that can't be guessed, b) giving you different passwords for every service to protect from leaks, and sticky notes are terrible at doing that at any scale, especially when you can't autofill them to the appropriate website.
Granted, a lot of services basically design their service for the common denominator of people using sticky notes by instituting rate limits, requiring 2FA, etc.