Comment by lbriner
2 days ago
That is an unfair conclusion. These people run complex networks like the rest of us, they probably have a range of detection systems and, also like the rest of us, an almost impossibly large attack surface to consider internally and on their supply chain.
The problem is that it is really, really hard to make something secure even if you try and follow all the best-practices you know.
I guess the awkward bit is marketing everything as certificate this, accreditation that and overselling how secure it is although I don't really know how else you would word it, "as secure as we know how"?
As Ops person, massive doubt. I've been at companies that have gotten hacked twice now, neither my department though. Both times, security vulnerabilities that hackers got into were well known, the tickets were in the backlog and deprioritized over feature requests.
I've also seen cases where it's like, maybe we shouldn't share S3 Root Creds or put it on the VPC so we can monitor outgoing traffic but too many applications would need to be redeployed for that so skip it. Those 2 year old tickets were still sitting in the backlog when I left.
If we ever get report, it's extremely likely going to be massive failure and only way to change this is fines for company that are bankrupting.
EDIT: Oh yea, SOC2 needs to go away. It's security theater that's just giving cover to companies.
I'd say it's not so much "as secure as we know how" and a lot more "as secure as we're willing to pay for". I'm sure this company has competent sysadmins and devs who'd be happy to lock things down. Usually management doesn't want the expense or the hassle.
This is kinda my point though - just don’t do it in the first place is the answer. Nothing is unhackable. So don’t create a massive honeypot in the first place.
Those aren’t the people in charge. People like 93 year old Senator Chuck Grassley are calling the shots.