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Comment by greyface-

11 hours ago

Why would they serve a secret subpoena and gag order, when instead they can just drive to a secluded location 5km away from the super secure datacenter, dig a few meters down, passively tap a strand or two, facility and service operators none the wiser?

They’ve already done both. When they can get a cooperative party (AT&T, for example), they colocate their splitter equipment. When they can’t, they tap undersea and overland cables.

When it’s a hostile environment entirely, they hack and do secret operations and bribe.

The data would/should be encrypted; while the NSA did successfully tap Google's inter-datacenter traffic before the Snowden leaks, since then it is encrypted, too. Hopefully other providers won't fall for that trick anymore, either.

  • IIRC, Google addressed the incident you're referring to by adding E2E encryption to sensitive inter-DC RPC sessions, rather than by fully encrypting inter-DC traffic at the link level. It would be nice to be able to reasonably expect carrier/ISP backbones to be secure against this threat, but in our actual reality this seems like fantastical thinking.