Comment by stackghost
15 hours ago
Sure, but if you’re defending against a nation state actor hopefully you aren’t expecting a raspberry pi to keep you secure.
15 hours ago
Sure, but if you’re defending against a nation state actor hopefully you aren’t expecting a raspberry pi to keep you secure.
> Sure, but if you’re defending against a nation state actor hopefully you aren’t expecting a raspberry pi to keep you secure.
Is there anything about these techniques that are raspberry pi specific? It seems like they're using lasers to identify and flip particular bits in registers.
There are HSMs that are effectively immune to this attack by way of their construction and packaging. You need an optical path to the secure device. The only way to get at this is to tamper with the tamperproof part of the system.
Some very high end HSMs must be actively powered at all times which makes disturbances in their local environments detectable at all times as well. Getting lucky and drilling through a part of the enclosure that isn't directly protected won't help you if a barometric pressure sensor is tripped as a consequence of breaking the hermetic seal.
It sounds like a more cleaner method to obtain the keys versus using solvents and a lot of trial and error hardware. As described by Chris Gerlinsky with "How Do I Crack Satellite and Cable Pay TV?" [0] [1]
[0] https://simkl.com/tv/33956/chaos-communication-congress/seas...
[1] https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8127-how_do_i_crack_satellite_an...
> Getting lucky and drilling through a part of the enclosure that isn't directly protected won't help you if a barometric pressure sensor is tripped as a consequence of breaking the hermetic seal.
That's interesting. I suppose if that technology is in use, the attack would have to occur in a pressure-controlled chamber, so breaking the seal wouldn't cause a change in pressure.
5 replies →
Your phone isn't going to have a "very high end HSM" any time soon. n Not until you're paying mid range car prices or more for your very specialised secure phone (and then that phone will probably be factory backdoored AN0M-style).
Are any of these tamper-proof chips in my phone or laptop?
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> You need an optical path to the secure device.
Any path can be made into an optical path with a bright enough light. >smile<
The RP2350 is an inexpensive microcontroller IC with reasonable performance and some very useful (and somewhat unusual) features in its PIO blocks.
Why wouldn't a person build that into the heart of something important?
"Important" and "tamper proof against a determined adversary" are very different goals.
Tamper proof against a determined adversary starts at 'call us' not at '$10'.
Depending on what sort of important you're talking, those ICs don't have the usual "something important" environmental specs, like an extended temperature range, or certification for automotive use or safety critical applications, for one thing.
>Why wouldn't a person build that into the heart of something important?
Because it's inexpensive and not designed to be tamper-resistant. If preventing this type of thing is your goal there are chips out there designed to break irrepairably if tampered with.
Rp2350s are advertised as having quite a few anti-tamper functions. They had a bounty when it launched to find similar vulnerabilities and they worked to patch the ones that were found. This is a lot more credible than a lot of advertised anti-tamper features.