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Comment by WalterBright

7 hours ago

Color me skeptical.

There was nothing wrong with the MCAS concept. The implementation of it, however, wasn't very good.

Unfortunately, two of the 3 crews did not understand the runaway stabilizer trim procedure. The 3rd crew did, and landed safely, and the media never reports on that.

The runaway stab trim procedure is a "memory item", meaning pilots shouldn't need a checklist to deal with it.

> The runaway stab trim procedure…

But doesn’t apply to MCAS because the symptoms and recovery procedures are distinct.

The MCAS system wasn’t documented, pilots weren’t trained on it, it didn’t indicate anything distinct in the cockpit, and it could rapidly put the plane into an unrecoverable attitude where pilots no longer had the physical strength to overcome the forces involved.

  • I know how the stab trim system works. I worked on it (for the 757) for three years.

    Yes, it applies to MCAS.

    > the symptoms and recovery procedures are distinct

    Nope. MCAS failure manifests itself as runaway trim, and the emergency procedures for it are exactly what is needed to recover from it.

    1. the stab trim switches override the MCAS signals. Override. That means the pilot can trim to normal using the column mounted trim switches. The column switches will power the trim back to normal. No physical strength is required.

    2. there's a "stab trim cutoff" switch on the console. That turns off the trim system. MCAS cannot bypass it.

    The proof is the 3rd MCAS incident. The pilots trimmed it back to normal, and turned the stab trim system off.

    That's all they had to do.

    This is supposed to be a "memory item". The other two crews did not remember the memory item. Boeing even sent out an Emergency Airworthiness Directive reiterating this information. It was ignored by the EA pilots, who did everything wrong (including overspeeding the airplane at full thrust).

    The narrative you wrote is the typical one in the mass media, which is utterly wrong. The proof of that is they ignore the 3rd incident which didn't fit the narrative.

    I've talked with two 737 pilots about this. They agree with me, though I knew I was right anyway.

    Food for thought: ever wonder why the stab trim cutoff switch is in a prominent place on the center console in easy reach?

    • You just took Boeing adding a secret system that can cause a plane to crash and then blamed the pilots who were unfortunate to be a victim of malfunctioning sensors and then put all the blame on them because pilots who didn't want to die inside a deathtrap aircraft figured out how to avoid their own death the moment they realized that the MCAS crashes were not an isolated incident?

      What exactly are you accusing the pilots involved with the accident of? That they had some perverse incentive to die?

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