Comment by skaul
4 days ago
So two hops, basically. First hop sees your IP address but not the website you're going to, second hop sees website but not IP address. Similar to Private Relay: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102602.
4 days ago
So two hops, basically. First hop sees your IP address but not the website you're going to, second hop sees website but not IP address. Similar to Private Relay: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102602.
But if both services keep logs de-anonymization is a join.
(Carl from Obscura here)
Very true, but if even 1 of (Obscura, Mullvad) is honest, there's no de-anonymization.
For traditional Single-Party VPNs, you just need to compromise 1 party, with Two-Party Relays, you need to compromise both.
> Very true, but if even 1 of (Obscura, Mullvad) is honest
Just Obscura's compromise is enough, as pointed out previously: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43016574
Unless something has changed in Obscura's architecture, the interface with Mullvad is under Obscura's control, and thus it can compromise client's credentials. This is unlike iCloud Private Relay where the guarantees are cryptographic in nature and not merely based on promises.
They don't even need to. If you observe enough of them you can correlate traffic patterns between them and find out which one is used by which endpoint
(Carl from Obscura here)
Yup, exactly!
Cool work. Can I ask: why not use MASQUE for this, instead of WireGuard-over-QUIC? Is it because it meant less changes on your partner's side?
(Carl from Obscura here)
Yup! Mostly less changes on Mullvad's side. Also QUIC has less overhead than MASQUE by definition.