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Comment by tptacek

7 hours ago

It really probably is the worst security specification ever written.

It’s also enormous, I assume from the attempt to have nominally composable parts that could be reused for other flows.

It’s three entire specs bundled as one. One for the XML components, another for the documents you build from them, and another for the authentication flows built on top.

  • It is truly surprising how large the specs for each of these ecosystems are: PKI, Kerberos, TLS, OAuth, SAML, etc. They are gargantuan, especially when you include essential dependencies like DER codecs and ASN.1 compilers (PKI, Kerberos) or XML (SAML).

The root problem with SAML is there’s a million and one permutations to do the same thing.

Signed assertions. Signed messages. Encrypted messages. Encrypted assertions. Sign after normalization. Sign before normalization. Encrypt then sign. Sign then encrypt.

There’s too many ways to do too many things.