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Comment by curiousObject

17 days ago

This story is a case of someone tampering with devices in the supply chain, before the user first receives them.

What you’re describing is a different thing. It’s an “evil maid” attack, when you tamper with a wallet that is already set up by the user. Also, it would be ultra difficult and expensive.

What you’re saying is possible. But:

It would probably be cheaper to build a total fake Ledger Wallet, then just replace the new real wallet and deliver a fake with a weak entropy generator. Any case, that’s not what has happened this time.

The legit wallets have an online way to verify they are genuine by cryptographic means. A totally new fake couldn't do that.

  • Thanks. I believe you’re right a totally fake copy couldn’t verify. So that idea was wrong.

    (The MITM supply chain attack which has happened succeeds because it preserves the original secure hardware but intercepts the secret data at the display interface. But a low-effort mimic of the entire device like I suggested? That wouldn’t work).

  • Ledger provides a 'Genuine Check' mechanism to determine the authenticity of the device; however, it explicitly warns that it cannot detect added implants when the device's original Secure Element remains intact.

    And as this workaround leaves the original Secure Element intact, good luck detecting the supply chain attack.