Comment by throw0101c
12 hours ago
The attacker could hijack the network and initiate the ACME protocol against the CA in the CAA field. There is a draft for dns-account-01 which allows one to specify an ACME account which is authorized for updates (which uses the account key (and not cert key)):
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-dns-ac...
haven't heard about dns-account-01, thanks! Heard only about dns-persist-01.
I meant to say that CAA record can also specify account, or at least Let’s Encrypt docs mention it[1]. So unless attacker has access to victim's account - they can't get a cert (unless they can hijack dns, too).
[1]: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/caa/#the-accounturi-parameter
Account seems to be a later extension to CAA:
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8657