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Comment by mnahkies

1 day ago

I've seen an agent autonomously upload a jar to a random file host, in an attempt to be helpful as ssh between my host and it's VM wasn't working (which was trivially fixed, but I guess it was in a hurry)

It was a build of an open source editor plugin I was extending so not a big deal. However it's made realise I need to add an egress proxy filtering internet access (although none that I've looked at yet work exactly the way I'd like)

On that same line I saw code written by a model try (and fail) to download an extension from a GitHub repo. The download failed because the name of the repo was wrong by one letter.

All one would need is to register gilhub.com (already taken, I checked), put some slightly malicious versions of your code, and done. Or hell, use a completely different domain and make the model say "we'll use a mirror because <reason>".

  • No, because the agent is run inside a sandbox that prevents execution or committing of code downloaded from the internet without express review and approval, right? Right?

    If that's not the case, then the problem is the user of the AI, not the model. Any model is capable of requesting actions that violate security or are otherwise harmful, not only ones that have been maliciously trained for that. Both OpenAI and Anthropic have proven this multiple times.

    In the end, the model itself is just a bunch of numbers. It's up to you, as the person running the harness through which the model gains any agency, to restrict the AI from performing malicious actions.

    • > It's up to you, as the person running the harness through which the model gains any agency, to restrict the AI from performing malicious actions.

      I believe that this line of thinking, while fine in theory, fails when faced with reality. As evidence of developers being overwhelmed by AI code I'd like to offer this post with almost 600 votes and 700+ comments titled "How to deal with shipping AI-written code you don't understand?" [1].

      Once you have a malicious model inside your infrastructure generating thousands of lines of code, it doesn't matter how good the sandbox is - if the generated malicious code makes it through code review once, it is game over.

      [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50151036

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