Comment by gnabgib
5 hours ago
This is why there are OS trust stores. Electron - if you use the system CA [0] and cURL[1] apps use it, which are you talking about?
5 hours ago
This is why there are OS trust stores. Electron - if you use the system CA [0] and cURL[1] apps use it, which are you talking about?
The CT log is a property of the individual leaf certificate not a property of the issuing chain. You could have the same CA in the trust store issue an unlogged certificate and non browsers would trust it.
A CT log isn't super relevant (it's not the CRL, it's just a log), but it's maintained/delivered by the CA not the leaf. Never the leaf.
If you mean CRL/Revocation list, everything but the root [you can't revoke a root] is maintained by the tier above. Leaf -> intermediate (these), [Intermediate -> Intermediate*], Intermediate -> Root.
Not sure why you're mentioning transparency logs, they have nothing to do with this (nor help).
Because the thread: "a lot of non-browser software doesn't check CT logs", you replied saying it's a reason to use the OS trust store, not sure how that fixes things? Maybe it would relieve them of the responsibility of pushing out a distrust update?
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Curl does not check that certificates have a valid SCT attached. Thus it will accept a certificate that isn't in the CT logs. That's mostly independent of the OS trust stores.