Comment by lmz
11 hours ago
The CT log is a property of the individual leaf certificate not a property of the issuing chain. You could have the same CA in the trust store issue an unlogged certificate and non browsers would trust it.
11 hours ago
The CT log is a property of the individual leaf certificate not a property of the issuing chain. You could have the same CA in the trust store issue an unlogged certificate and non browsers would trust it.
A CT log isn't super relevant (it's not the CRL, it's just a log), but it's maintained/delivered by the CA not the leaf. Never the leaf.
If you mean CRL/Revocation list, everything but the root [you can't revoke a root] is maintained by the tier above. Leaf -> intermediate (these), [Intermediate -> Intermediate*], Intermediate -> Root.
Not sure why you're mentioning transparency logs, they have nothing to do with this (nor help).
Because the thread: "a lot of non-browser software doesn't check CT logs", you replied saying it's a reason to use the OS trust store, not sure how that fixes things? Maybe it would relieve them of the responsibility of pushing out a distrust update?
That's not what woodruff is talking about (I hope). The CT logs allow us to (later) find who/why it happened. CT Logs in no way help you stop something. (Depends a bit on how software reacts to apparently invalid issuance - but since these have the real keys the issuance will look normal).
Revocation lists allow you to stop/block bad issues. Both are maintained/decided (you could post to another service) by the issuer, not the leaf. CRL records would stop this (but some software has decided that's too slow). In general software uses the OS trust-store first (fragmented on Linux). Firefox and Java have their own independent paths. Chrome ignores CRLs
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