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Comment by charcircuit

7 hours ago

>Chainguard unilaterally broke the embargo and published built images containing the fix.

>This disregarded weeks of work by many parties toward a coordinated disclosure.

Good. Coordinated disclosure meant that people couldn't protect themselves. That's not a good thing. It meant sites were forced to shut down instead of simply updating.

No... Uncoordinated disclosure meant that attackers were suddenly armed with detailed information about an already-hyped severe vuln hours before the majority of downstream consumers had the means to patch their systems.

Maybe your calculus could hold if Chainguard's registry were the primary distribution mechanism for PHP in use worldwide (such that the benefit of an updated image would at least be widespread compared to the sitting ducks relying on the other repositories), but it isn't.

  • I will nitpick on that, if it was just released as a patch, there wouldn't be a hype to begin with, just point update to apply.

    I'm just gonna assume patch was ready for a while and the wait time was just letting big players to update their own stuff before it is available for the public, and at that point it is just making the rest of the internet second class citizens not "worthy" enough to get the update quicker.

  • If the sites are taking no action they will be vulnerable no matter when the patch is released. For the people who do take action before chainguard's release the safe option was to just turn off your server (and let any big competitor site stay up and take your traffic since they got the patch ahead of time). People taking this option will be offline until a fix is available for them to use. They are not in danger of being hacked.

    Trying to say that uncordinated disclosure is bad because people might get hacked yesterday instead of today just is not a convincing argument to me. I prefer the solution that results in the minimum amount of downtime for sites and sites provide value to society.

You need to pay to get access to chainguard images.

  • That is incredibly damaging to the trust that coordinated vulnerability disclosure depends upon. The obvious consequence is that Chainguard should never again receive embargoed fixes in advance. You don’t get invited back into the room after demonstrating that you can’t be trusted with the information.

    They didn’t get to unilaterally decide that the embargo was inconvenient and publish early.

    • Why do you place a higher priority on maintaining coordinated vulnerability disclosure than of the safety of actual users of the software being protected?