curl: (60) SSL certificate OpenSSL verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20)
More details here: https://curl.se/docs/sslcerts.html
curl failed to verify the legitimacy of the server and therefore could not
establish a secure connection to it. To learn more about this situation and
how to fix it, please visit the webpage mentioned above.
Worth noting that people on RedHat still haven't received proper updates, only a workaround that disables two Comodo root certificates that were used to sign the emudhra certificates.
I chose AlmaLinux last time I needed to, and it's been a great way to access the ecosystem — I heartily recommend it as a free RHEL! — but these past few days have me looking in envy at Debian. Corporate stability hasn't been what I expected.
This is such a clusterfuck. I use so many containers in my home lab and various local installations and stuff. Honestly, I have no idea what I'm even supposed to do at this point because I'm not a full time developer.
Well, that is what people who have been around the block a few times have been saying about containers since just about forever. "I don't want to be an admin for my n software packages, I'll use containers!" - now you are the admin of n containers, except with worse tools than your distro and no upstream support.
don't worry. if you're in this situation with this attitude, you're likely running out of date container base images and whatnot.
i highly suggest you forget about containers, learn about systemd unit file hardening, and then you only have to play sysadmin to your base os and the binary for the program you want to run.
Go is not vulnerable in the same way software using webpki is, because it generally uses the system trust store. However, this change is about golang proactively blocking the certs, so that even if your OS doesn't update, it still won't trust them.
That's not the case, Go uses the system store with an additional revoke/deny list in crypto/x509 because it allows updating a deployed application on an out of date or slow moving platform or OS.
This CVE is literally just "versions of the Go deny list don't contain the eMuhdra revokation yet". Older versions of Go will still deny certs signed through the compromised certificate if the system store already has the update.
Great. The technology has progressed enough to kill the existing technologies. It's like the fish in a pool creating a shark that eats away all the fish while the fish proudly announce that their great creation (shark) as the frontier progress for their fish race.
Agents have dramatically increased the ability to poke at every single surface out there. I would be surprised if the researcher who found this wasn't assisted by a llm.
A lot of software is going to be forced to update or retire soon, all unpatched software should be retired off the internet immediately because AI agents are in waiting.
No it affects everybody, but most browsers/OSs etc have updated already. This is just a workaround Go put in case the underlying OS has not been updated. Not sure why this link is on the front page as it duplicates previous posts and confuses people, I think it should be merged.
In other words, that software bundled the compromised certs into the binary, so upgrading it is the only way to remove them.
This is about Go proactively blocking intermediates. Which shouldn't strictly be necessary as long as your OS has removed or distrusted the CAs (on my laptop, macOS has done that, although it seems like it did so in a way not all tools have access to; for example, rustls-platform-verifier respects it, but rustls-webpki still loads the bad CAs from the system trust store).
Gentoo Linux users are adviced to update the package "app-misc/ca-certificates" to version "20260816.3.125" or higher!:
To check via "curl":
They should return:
---
* GLSA 202610-01: https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202610-01
* https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
Worth noting that people on RedHat still haven't received proper updates, only a workaround that disables two Comodo root certificates that were used to sign the emudhra certificates.
https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026... - "Ongoing"
RHEL also got the PHP patches hours after Debian.
I chose AlmaLinux last time I needed to, and it's been a great way to access the ecosystem — I heartily recommend it as a free RHEL! — but these past few days have me looking in envy at Debian. Corporate stability hasn't been what I expected.
Python users may need to take their own separate steps, see this discussion:
https://discuss.python.org/t/information-for-python-users-re...
This is such a clusterfuck. I use so many containers in my home lab and various local installations and stuff. Honestly, I have no idea what I'm even supposed to do at this point because I'm not a full time developer.
Well, that is what people who have been around the block a few times have been saying about containers since just about forever. "I don't want to be an admin for my n software packages, I'll use containers!" - now you are the admin of n containers, except with worse tools than your distro and no upstream support.
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don't worry. if you're in this situation with this attitude, you're likely running out of date container base images and whatnot.
i highly suggest you forget about containers, learn about systemd unit file hardening, and then you only have to play sysadmin to your base os and the binary for the program you want to run.
"Hey claude this is the cve I need you to fix [link]"
Takes about 20 seconds. Depending if you need to hit enter.
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uv should be your friend.
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Welcome to corporate
> Failure to do so could result in monster-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against TLS clients, including python.org and pypi.org .
Monster?
Gender-neutral variant of man-in-the-middle. They should have just used something less controversial like master-in-the-middle.
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This is news for NIST but old news generally speaking, being the eMudhra debacle. Or am I missing something?
It's the Go version of it, I think.
Go is not vulnerable in the same way software using webpki is, because it generally uses the system trust store. However, this change is about golang proactively blocking the certs, so that even if your OS doesn't update, it still won't trust them.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/82345
But the Go version is as well old news, actually it was one of the first stories about eMudhra appearing on the HN homepage yesterday.
This seems to be about ‘go’ proactively blocking emudhra certs even though the system trust store is out of date? https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6809
"proactively" doing some work.
The problem is Golang has it's own trust store. So you don't benefit from OS patching.
That's not the case, Go uses the system store with an additional revoke/deny list in crypto/x509 because it allows updating a deployed application on an out of date or slow moving platform or OS.
This CVE is literally just "versions of the Go deny list don't contain the eMuhdra revokation yet". Older versions of Go will still deny certs signed through the compromised certificate if the system store already has the update.
It's an or situation, not and.
eMudhra 1FA OTP Login Bypass: https://mastodon.catgirl.cloud/@49016/117475921584308861
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Yesterday's discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579
Great. The technology has progressed enough to kill the existing technologies. It's like the fish in a pool creating a shark that eats away all the fish while the fish proudly announce that their great creation (shark) as the frontier progress for their fish race.
Create the problem, sell the solution
Here a CA derived a secret key from the number 4.
If you think "that's weird to see such a small number in key generation" than you're one step ahead of whoever generated that key.
Unfortunately, unlike with RSA, small primes are not apparent in elliptic cryptography.
Oh my God it's literally this XKCD https://xkcd.com/221/
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RFC 1149.5 FTW
> Here a CA derived a secret key from the number 4
https://xkcd.com/221/
Nor small composites, apparently.
The eMudhra CA compromises had nothing to do with LLMs? But I love the vibes.
Agents have dramatically increased the ability to poke at every single surface out there. I would be surprised if the researcher who found this wasn't assisted by a llm.
2 replies →
> It's like the fish in a pool creating a shark
What a weird comparison...
This is basically the whole idea of the novel War with the Newts
What are you talking about?
https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
It's down for me, are they on PHP? :D
I'd assume hugged to death
Try this: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111943
Up for me, but slow to load.
it's been slow for me since yesterday, i chalked it up to PHP CVEs + throttling a VPN user
We are in the era of 6 digit CVE now
A lot of software is going to be forced to update or retire soon, all unpatched software should be retired off the internet immediately because AI agents are in waiting.
The death of security by obscurity
Yeah, the entire internet is a dark forest now.
Related (2 days ago): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50160877
Im guessing this only affects Go? But I am guessing that from the nist page as none of the headlines mention it at all.
No it affects everybody, but most browsers/OSs etc have updated already. This is just a workaround Go put in case the underlying OS has not been updated. Not sure why this link is on the front page as it duplicates previous posts and confuses people, I think it should be merged.
Here is the original story: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579
Thanks for clarifying
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It's a bit surprising that this took ~1.5days to end up on HN.
It didn't
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579
It was here yesterday, this is just another good opportunity to farm some points.
Fix for OSX - put this in ~/.zshrc:
To verify, log in to a new shell and run
TL;DR:
The very urgent uv/certifi/etc releases (and yet-to-be-done bun release) are about removing the compromised CAs as described here:
https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
In other words, that software bundled the compromised certs into the binary, so upgrading it is the only way to remove them.
This is about Go proactively blocking intermediates. Which shouldn't strictly be necessary as long as your OS has removed or distrusted the CAs (on my laptop, macOS has done that, although it seems like it did so in a way not all tools have access to; for example, rustls-platform-verifier respects it, but rustls-webpki still loads the bad CAs from the system trust store).
edit: forgot I can't use code blocks on HN
> edit: forgot I can't use code blocks on HN
I wonder if they made this change with an assumption that the root CAs wouldn't be distrusted later same day, too.
Cock-up or conspiracy?
Any sufficiently advanced stupidity is indistinguishable from malice.
I have seen way more malice pretending to be just stupid than the actual stupidity
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