Comment by thecopy
6 hours ago
I recommend everyone to move your plantext secrets from ~/.kube/config, ~/.ssh etc into a password-manager. You can tell Claude to adjust the config files to get the secrets from 1Password when they are needed with TouchID requirements etc.
These days I’m getting so many 1Password prompts for agents pulling env variables out of it and with very little context of what is being accessed by who (The dialog 1Password shows is pretty bad) that it would be very easy for something to slip in there.
> I’m getting so many 1Password prompts for agents pulling env variables out of it and with very little context of what is being accessed by who
This is a one-sentence horror story. I almost can't believe someone would let this happen, unless the 1Password account is not important (highly unlikely).
Permission fatigue is real.
I know it sounds bad, but it’s the reality for most people, just like permission prompts at every corner and after each macOS / app update (“Your screenshot app is watching your screen”, no shit, that’s why I installed it).
I have been using Yubikeys for years, according to this guide: https://github.com/drduh/yubikey-guide
The nice thing is that using the private key requires physical touch. That means that AI itself (or a remote attacker, for that matter) can't do things unless I confirm.
if $5.6B is protected by your index finger then you're gonna need kidnap insurance, and a really good pair of gloves.
It's not protected by the index finger at all. There is no fingerprint reader in a Yubikey. The only protection is that it requires physical access and can't be triggered from software.
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The point is the attacker has to be near you and mot somewhere around the globe
Sigh. I forgot I posted this in a crypto-related thread.
How would that help when your workstation is compromised? They can just steal your authentication the moment you log in through the password manager
It does help in that the secrets are not in plain-text, readable for any script you run. With 1Password, a process asks for the password and it gets transferred not through the filesystem but through IPC. 1Password shows a dialog: "Do you want iTerm to get your SSH key ABC123?"
In my thinking, this is more secure than plaintext in filesystem
If your system is compromised, it doesn't matter what you are using: the attacker will get the password for whatever secure thing you store your secrets in.
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My secret is `4`. Is that ok? Do I still need to move it??
4 is fine, but only if you’re a certificate authority.
I use 'Solarwinds123'
as for ssh keys, you can generate your keypair in secure enclave and reuiqre touchId for every new ssh session. The private key never leaves the secure enclave.
Probably the better option instead of relying on a password manager.
It is a tradeoff. When using secure enclave, you need a second backup keypair in cold storage that needs to be secured.
Isn’t the password manager a prime target too?
you know most password managers have open sockets, or other channels to other local processes to interact with and allow stealing entries?
you know most tools like gcloud, bitwarden, etc store auth keys just in dotfiles too?
Local compromise is KO now, and we can't do shit on platforms like MacOs didn't research Linux recently