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Comment by mik1998

2 days ago

Constant time strcmp doesn't fix it. The problem is that the user doesn't have a password at all (the hash is *). But which hashing algorithm is used is encoded in the password. So they pick a different user's hash to not leak the information that there is no password. Alternate solution would be to hardcode a specific algorithm, but that could also leak info in many cases, I guess.

No, I get that -- my first point was meant to allude to that but maybe it wasn't phrased particularly well. The bit about constant-time strcmp() was about comparing the hashes afterwards, which was a classic attack to extract the password hash for offline cracking (though salts probably make it untenable?).

In any case, the fact you need access to an existing hash to not select something stupid like DES is all due to crypt(3) being a wacky API and while callers could work around it by selecting more reasonable defaults it's a pretty big foot gun.