So to recap, Twitter exploded onto the scene in 2007, the "fail whale" appeared a lot, developers made all sorts of wonderful programs hooked into Twitter, the fail whale disappeared, Twitter started to destroy the app ecosystem, App.net launched to great fanfare in response to Twitter's knuckleheaded anti-developer stance, Britney Spears and Justin Bieber arrived and knocked all the nerds out of the top spots on Twitterholic, Donald Trump came and bludgeoned everyone with his bombastic prose, and now App.net is shutting down.
And after all this, Twitter still does not have a viable business model.
> And after all this, Twitter still does not have a viable business model.
...more pertinently, App.net didn't have one either - and they had an open API, charged real money and did all the things HNers' idealized version of Twitter would.
Right - it seemed at the time it might become e an idealized version of Twitter. My hope was that by having to pay money to get in, it would keep out the shills and noise. I was a paid member for several years but it became clear that none of the people I followed moved so it became a ghost town.
You're forgetting that by the time app.net came up twitter was already "the" platform for this sort of stuff. App.net didn't improve on the model in any way. No awesome features, no additional value. It tried to compete with a service that's already used by millions with terrible branding (starting with the name) and a pricing model that's good for SaaS companies (because they work with business that use the solution to make money) with consumers (who don't).
Having a business model is nice. Having the right business model is essential. Twitter has a business model now, and while it isn't ideal it's in line with their type of product/company and if you scroll through some of the other comments this model isn't all that bad.
Twitter can improve it, but that's a story for a different thread.
Did it? I remember registering lots of accounts just when it launched because I had a column in tweetdeck with a search that was something like "app.net/invite-code/" (all invite codes URLs started with the same pattern) so every time someone posted an invite URL I got a notification and I could register a new account ;^}
Yeah it's pretty ridiculous. Also, Twitter still has an anti-developer stance. For the shutting down of App.net despite Twitter's unchanged politics to make sense, I think it's because the Twitter model as a whole is dying (which obviously includes App.net and similar microblogging services). I hear Instagram and Snapchat is all the rage now. Ain't nobody got time to actually read text these days in the days of strongly social networkified attention spans.
I think we would all be better served if the blockchain could be replicated and tweaked to become a new public publishing platform that is the equivalent of Twitter today. Access to the blockchain would then become a function of clients who follow the established spec/protocol, analogous to browsers and the web today. There are a couple of startups that are already pursuing the idea, but I think that this could only become realistic if Twitter were to die.
Let's take all of Twitter's scaling problems and put them on a protocol design that's way more difficult to scale and optimized for entirely different access patterns and bandwidth requirements?
This seems like a entirely inappropriate application for blockchains. There are other more suitable P2P constructs we could create using similar ideas (which predated bitcoin) instead of jumping on a bandwagon.
Twitter has no issue making money: They made over a billion last year. Their problem is in growing: They have about the same users they had 2 years ago.
Maybe Twitter is fully grown. There will be some churn, but it's basically as big as it's going to get. With the current user base, they can generate billions of dollars in revenue.
The problem, then, seems to be with management and the board not understanding or maybe not accepting reality as it is. If they can figure out how to run Twitter with hundreds of people rather than thousands, they will have a great business.
Not sure what more you can do when the business isn't going well. 2+ years of maintenance, open sourcing, 2 months notice, data export, no additional billings.
I continue to be at least somewhat optimistic that non ad-supported models are worth trying. It seems like Patreon is doing really well and is perhaps something we can all learn from.
I'd be very curious to hear the kind of questions this raises about the app economy. Do you mean mobile apps? All software?
App.net was neither. It tried to be a platform for too many things for not enough people. So I can't see how its failure reflects on the economy and not just a bad idea.
Also it's pretty awesome to see a shutdown accompanied with an open sourcing. If every startup did this, we'd have a ton more open source code out there to play with.
I just looked at their community guidelines and saw this:
Non-U.S. residents and citizens must follow the laws of their domicile pertaining to online conduct, communication and content. Gab AI, Inc. will respect the territorial sovereignty of nation-states and their applicable laws pertaining to online communications, though we urge governments of the world to consider Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
So does this mean they are willing to censor content from people who live in less-free countries based on those countries' laws even though they don't have to, being based in the US? Isn't that weird for a "free speech" network?
This is an unfortunate, but not unexpected, end of an era. App.net was created at a time when discontent was high with how Twitter was treating its users and 3rd party app developers. Even though App.net wasn't hugely successful, its existence provided a needed check against Twitter exercising user-hostile control over their platform.
However, it has not been a viable platform (one that people actually used) for many years, so while I am saddened that it is finally being shut down, I'm not surprised. Many thanks to Dalton and everyone who built it and kept it going these many years!
App.net came out in 2012, and while I can't really remember the specific areas of discontent that I experienced with Twitter back then, here's an article I found:
I think what everyone was worried about back then was that Twitter was changing the nature of what Twitter was. Twitter started placing limits on API tokens, introduced new UI in the form of cards, which could also be used for ads, etc. There was a sense that the freedom and openness of the Twitter platform was quickly diminishing.
Twitter's response was basically no response, but in a good way. They slowed down making those sorts of radical changes, and to this day you can still browse Twitter with a 3rd-party app like TweetBot and never see cards or ads.
It didn't need to. App.net was a "success" at first because the bigshots from the tech twitter-sphere all jumped over.
Problem was none of them actually stopped posting on Twitter, at best they just set app.net to mirror their Twitter never really engaging with the network because none of them were willing to give up their high follower counts they had from being early adopters of Twitter.
Too much ego to put up with the BS from twitter, yet also too much ego to give up their high follower counts.
If people were dissatisfied with Twitter, they could leave and join App.net. If enough people did this and App.net reached critical mass, it could have become the default service of its kind.
Since the primary motivation for people switching to App.net was them getting upset at Twitter, they slowed down the frequency and breadth of the changes they were making to their service so as to upset fewer people and less frequently. In the end, this was a positive outcome for users that liked Twitter exactly the way it used to be and didn't want it to change.
Of course, Twitter's changes may not have been motivated by App.net at all, but even if not there was still an escape hatch for users if things got too bad.
I would assume it's just a case of installing your chosen software package on a web server. I don't know how easy that is. The more mature packages are probably better-documented in this regard.
App.net and Medium have the same issue (why advertising is more lucrative than selling blogging software directly to content creators):
Let's say for every one content creator that are on average 100 eyeballs on the content they create (1:100). Almost universally, the 100 eyeballs can be translated to more economic value than the 1, and hence why the advertising model is so lucrative.
App.net from what I understand wasn't so much trying to sell to content creators as it was trying to create a Social-Graph-As-A-Service thing. I thought the original pitch was essentially two fold:
build your network with App.net and users can basically just opt-in automagically importing their data from other App.net networks thereby reducing the friction and hopefully making it easier to over come the ghost-town problem.
build your network with App.net and tool makers (including you) automatically get a well defined/robust/tested API to write apps against to interact with your network.
The advertising model is "lucrative" because that's where all the money is shunted, because that's what MarCom knows how to do. There's a century and a half of advertising agencies who need to capitalize on their training, and the newspaper/TV model is what we've gotten for it.
Personally, I always wanted to see a site that has ads and is free to read, but charges a small fee to create an account - just to see if it would help reduce trolling and sock puppets.
I find cloud feadreader aren't that different at least from the view point of a passive reader. They seem to be profitable, by restricting free features. Like: only x feeds free to aggregate and a ~15 minute delay of all feeds. Search is also a pro feature. I also have the feeling twitter is extremely over engineered.
I applaud Dalton and Bryan for keeping ADN running for nearly 3 years after it ceased development. In truth, I think most of the users left back in May 2014, but it's still admirable that they kept it running.
If you'll excuse the self-plug, I wrote about the death of ADN back in 2014 and re-reading my post, I think it holds up.
I thought it's some kind of app store for android phones. Not sure why I made this association. But I guess their name might be one of the reasons of failure. It's simple and short, but doesn't really tell anything about the product.
I have the experience, that services with generic sounding domain names are never successfull. The only remotely successfull generic sounding domain site that I can think of is about.com
There are some exceptions, like messenger.com which I don't think is a counter-example. I think that messenger.com would be no-more or less successfull if it was named barf.com. People use it because facebook already has a foothold.
#1, but not inherently as much as for the effect it had on the consequences of other decisions: they launched with a hard pay-wall for the first couple years and that made the identity crisis fatal. They got a good deal of initial publicity but the first thing anyone curious got was a requirement that they pay to use it. That's always going to be a hard sell but it was especially bad when the messaging was so confused about whether it was a platform to build apps on, a Twitter competitor, etc. since the cost was real and up-front but any benefits were largely hypothetical based on enough other people deciding to pay at all and some of them building apps.
I think a subscription model could be viable with better execution but it really seems like that would be best with a tiered approach so the social network wasn't held back by the payment requirement.
I think your diagnosis is on target: "the cost was real and up-front but any benefits were largely hypothetical based on enough other people deciding to pay at all and some of them building apps."
But freemium is hard: Either you make a market for ads, and have intrusive data collection and analytics, and you have to compete with the most intrusive ad-supported products that already dominate the ad market and you become as bad as them, OR you have pure freemium and you have the question of how to make the up-sell compelling enough while keeping the free level of service interesting enough. The only good example of success at freemium is LinkedIn where they segmented their user population and only made the recruiters pay a very high premium price.
I suspect 1 is the big turnoff. It's really hard to make people pay for something they can get for free, with a better perceived value. App.net promised to have value in the future, but demanded payment upfront. Twitter offers immediate value without demanding any form of payment.
I sort of agree. App.net lacked value at launch because of the way it intended to build value - through apps on it's platform. That's inevitably slow just when you need to build take-off momentum, and there is no way to "prime the pump" except by throwing money at the problem and hoping you get the right apps.
Moreover, Twitter has a problem with churn. It's free to start, but baffling for many, and troll-infested if you stick around. All ad-supported social networks have that problem plus the invasiveness issue.
Building developer platforms is fun and exciting. Especially for the developers creating it, knowing that they are building a rockstar application for people just like them. Getting adoption and conversion to paying customers is so freaking hard and ultimately the end of the road.
I went down this road once (http://www.odatahq.com/) and loved every minute of it. I still look at what we made and find true joy in it. But the end game was typical of most developer platforms ...
I feel strange that this is the first time I've ever heard of app.net. I assumed it was something Microsoft related, apparently not. I suspect the combination of these things is why this failed.
Doomed to fail from the beginning. Horrible name which was leeched from Microsoft, and Twitter was clearly already so far ahead. AND THEY WANT ME TO PAY?
Really loved and appreciated what Dalton, Berg, and the team was able to build. It was an awesome community for quite a while. Great job and sorely missed.
IIRC YC had a bet in the subscription social network space for "family social networks." That has obvious problems with the growth model, similar to but different from Path which had an arbitrary limit on individuals' number of "true friends." Path was taking the word "friend" too literally. That got pivoted and/or rolled up. Where is it now?
I was an earlier user and still active to this day and it's sad but not unexpected to see them go. Their approach towards social networking business model was still a valuable experiment.
They did try to sell it for a couple of years but by that point in 2014 I think they had essentially given up already. But the revenue was covering the hosting costs so it seemed sensible to just leave it going, and leave possibilities open.
as an entrepreneur, you should know when it's time to let go. either you continue the start-up a.k.a the experiment, and try to iterate towards a more successful direction - or you shut it down. I think standstill at such a point is really the worst of all options.
App.net'S failures, IMO, were not a result of being too early as Dalton suggests. Instead, they failed at building a company. Confusing branding, wrong messaging, and ultimately a product without a need. That's why app.net failed.
less than 50000 downloads in Android and 60 reviews in AppStore in 5 years. I think you can get better numbers without marketing.
Seriously, whatever you do, you need to spend the same amount of time promoting it, otherwise no one will notice. 50000 downloads is nothing in 5 years, it is 2.7 users a day. If you are in SanFrancisco you can get more than 3 downloads a day just going to the street and talking with strangers.
Where were their budget for marketing? At least I would have expected 500k in marketing and 1$ per install, them we can talk about the users not liking the product or whatever.
UPDATE: you can keep downvoting (I would appreciate a feedback comment to explain the downvote) but it doesn't change the fact that marketing is more important than the product and they didn't spend on it
I don't mean to pick on you, but this is getting tiring for me. When you say 'marketing' you mean advertising and promotion, because product definition is part of marketing. Sizing up the market and determining what to build is marketing (inbound), advertising and promotion is also marketing (outbound). I realize these definitions have been in flux, but I'm talking traditional MBA definitions. I feel a lot nuance is being lost on people who believe marketing is a sophisticated-sounding term for advertising and promotion.
> I don't mean to pick on you, but this is getting tiring for me. When you say 'marketing' you mean advertising and promotion, because product definition is part of marketing.
Well, you shouldn't judge me so fast. I have an MBA with marketing and I have been working on marketing for some time in my life. So I am aware what a marketing plan involves, and promotion is a small portion of it. I cannot suppose the founders knew all about marketing, but I would expect them to spend some money in promotion even if it not wise money.
Maybe you like this more. You have to do some marketing: define your product, know your users, define your goals, find the channels where your users are, target them, promote your product to those users in those channels, measure the results, analyze what happened and rinse and repeat. (that was also a small definition because marketing is still more)
I'm a pretty active lurker on HN and I really had to think hard about what App.net was and why I might care. I think that is an indicator of why they might have had a hard time surviving. Even hardcore nerds didn't know about it so I really don't expect "normal" people to know about it. :(
This reeked of being dead the day it launched, so it's hardly surpising, but it's also tragic.
Why is it so hard to create a Twitter alternative that's popular and effective? Does the world tend to gravitate towards single standards for these things, like Facebook, HTTP or email?
Yeah basically that. People don't want extensible services or open platforms. They don't want full control over their data. They don't want 100% privacy. These are all niche things that like less than 1% of people want. Most people just want a thing that does one basic job and does it good enough.
"Network effects" on the WWW are artificial. We need to update our laws so that neither users nor developers can be punished for using any non-disruptive browsing device. A browsing device is anything that consumes data and shows it to users later.
Little guys like App.net won't stand much of a chance against the behemoths until the U.S. legalizes competition against the tech cartels.
Once that happens, sites like App.net and Twitter can compete on an even footing, and consumers will be free to choose services based on merit rather than lock-in.
It's rare to see a service as entrenched as Twitter get displaced unless it's just not Good Enough in some capacity.
It's possible that if Twitter crumples under the weight of the abuse, if it becomes nothing but a dead sea of trolls, that we'll see a successful replacement.
This is one of the big problems App.net always had, in that it wasn't at all intended to be a "Twitter alternative". Alpha was supposed to be an example of what could be built on the platform, not the entire product itself.
So to recap, Twitter exploded onto the scene in 2007, the "fail whale" appeared a lot, developers made all sorts of wonderful programs hooked into Twitter, the fail whale disappeared, Twitter started to destroy the app ecosystem, App.net launched to great fanfare in response to Twitter's knuckleheaded anti-developer stance, Britney Spears and Justin Bieber arrived and knocked all the nerds out of the top spots on Twitterholic, Donald Trump came and bludgeoned everyone with his bombastic prose, and now App.net is shutting down.
And after all this, Twitter still does not have a viable business model.
> And after all this, Twitter still does not have a viable business model.
...more pertinently, App.net didn't have one either - and they had an open API, charged real money and did all the things HNers' idealized version of Twitter would.
Right - it seemed at the time it might become e an idealized version of Twitter. My hope was that by having to pay money to get in, it would keep out the shills and noise. I was a paid member for several years but it became clear that none of the people I followed moved so it became a ghost town.
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Maybe because the reason people use twitter isn't because it is useful but rather because
Either:
It is cool. So we must use it.
Or:
Everyone else is using it so we must use it too.
Seriously:
140 characters? Feature?
Everyone can read everything? Feature?
The two biggest technical "features" of twitter can be arrived at by dumbing down either google+ or facebook 98%.
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You're forgetting that by the time app.net came up twitter was already "the" platform for this sort of stuff. App.net didn't improve on the model in any way. No awesome features, no additional value. It tried to compete with a service that's already used by millions with terrible branding (starting with the name) and a pricing model that's good for SaaS companies (because they work with business that use the solution to make money) with consumers (who don't).
Having a business model is nice. Having the right business model is essential. Twitter has a business model now, and while it isn't ideal it's in line with their type of product/company and if you scroll through some of the other comments this model isn't all that bad.
Twitter can improve it, but that's a story for a different thread.
Twitter finances (TTM):
revenue: $2.52B gross profit: $1.49B
It's only losing money because of stock grants.
> It's only losing money because of stock grants.
That's like saying "We're only losing money because we have to pay our staff"
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Okay, but don't these stock grants substitute for salary? It's not like Twitter could just stop granting stock with no ill effects.
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NYT story on the matter: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/business/dealbook/twitter...
TL;DR -- Twitter paid out about $680M in grants
Which is a lesson in how VC can easily destroy a viable, profitable business with a "money-chasing-money" strategy.
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With the type and amount of attention Twitter maintains it has multiple, very viable business models. Notably advertising, data sales & company tools.
Also App.net charged money for use.
Did it? I remember registering lots of accounts just when it launched because I had a column in tweetdeck with a search that was something like "app.net/invite-code/" (all invite codes URLs started with the same pattern) so every time someone posted an invite URL I got a notification and I could register a new account ;^}
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Yeah it's pretty ridiculous. Also, Twitter still has an anti-developer stance. For the shutting down of App.net despite Twitter's unchanged politics to make sense, I think it's because the Twitter model as a whole is dying (which obviously includes App.net and similar microblogging services). I hear Instagram and Snapchat is all the rage now. Ain't nobody got time to actually read text these days in the days of strongly social networkified attention spans.
I think we would all be better served if the blockchain could be replicated and tweaked to become a new public publishing platform that is the equivalent of Twitter today. Access to the blockchain would then become a function of clients who follow the established spec/protocol, analogous to browsers and the web today. There are a couple of startups that are already pursuing the idea, but I think that this could only become realistic if Twitter were to die.
Let's take all of Twitter's scaling problems and put them on a protocol design that's way more difficult to scale and optimized for entirely different access patterns and bandwidth requirements?
This seems like a entirely inappropriate application for blockchains. There are other more suitable P2P constructs we could create using similar ideas (which predated bitcoin) instead of jumping on a bandwagon.
Twitter has no issue making money: They made over a billion last year. Their problem is in growing: They have about the same users they had 2 years ago.
Maybe Twitter is fully grown. There will be some churn, but it's basically as big as it's going to get. With the current user base, they can generate billions of dollars in revenue.
The problem, then, seems to be with management and the board not understanding or maybe not accepting reality as it is. If they can figure out how to run Twitter with hundreds of people rather than thousands, they will have a great business.
I imagine they have fewer users than years ago -- I doubt they've been careful to remove _non-human-eye_ users from their MAU.
app.net never had the audience. Network effect is a real b##ch to overcome.
This is a refreshingly honest shutdown notice.
Congratulations to Dalton and co for trying something hard and worthwhile, and wrapping it up responsibly when it didn't pan out.
Not just honest, but a morally upstanding one.
Not sure what more you can do when the business isn't going well. 2+ years of maintenance, open sourcing, 2 months notice, data export, no additional billings.
Respect to Dalton and the team.
Open sourcing, data export and a 2 months notice forward are pretty respectful in my book. I wish these where standard procedures for the industry.
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My sentiment exactly. And I agree with Dalton it was worth trying to see if it could fly.
It raises a lot of interesting questions about the sustainability of the "app economy" for me.
I appreciate both of your sentiments, thank you.
I continue to be at least somewhat optimistic that non ad-supported models are worth trying. It seems like Patreon is doing really well and is perhaps something we can all learn from.
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I'd be very curious to hear the kind of questions this raises about the app economy. Do you mean mobile apps? All software?
App.net was neither. It tried to be a platform for too many things for not enough people. So I can't see how its failure reflects on the economy and not just a bad idea.
Also it's pretty awesome to see a shutdown accompanied with an open sourcing. If every startup did this, we'd have a ton more open source code out there to play with.
> If every startup did this...
But then every startup would have to shut down!
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Sad to see them go.
Mastodon, https://mastodon.social/, is a new and positive alternative. Mastodon is a free, open-source social network server. It's GNU Social-compatible and federated. https://github.com/tootsuite/mastodon
Diaspora is also still going strong with 20k MAU but there is no interaction between the pods https://the-federation.info/.
And there's also https://gab.ai if you're into free speech.
I just looked at their community guidelines and saw this:
Non-U.S. residents and citizens must follow the laws of their domicile pertaining to online conduct, communication and content. Gab AI, Inc. will respect the territorial sovereignty of nation-states and their applicable laws pertaining to online communications, though we urge governments of the world to consider Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
So does this mean they are willing to censor content from people who live in less-free countries based on those countries' laws even though they don't have to, being based in the US? Isn't that weird for a "free speech" network?
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I remember trying to sign up for gab.ai back when Milo Yanopopopopoulos was advertising it, but getting entered on a wait list.
This is an unfortunate, but not unexpected, end of an era. App.net was created at a time when discontent was high with how Twitter was treating its users and 3rd party app developers. Even though App.net wasn't hugely successful, its existence provided a needed check against Twitter exercising user-hostile control over their platform.
However, it has not been a viable platform (one that people actually used) for many years, so while I am saddened that it is finally being shut down, I'm not surprised. Many thanks to Dalton and everyone who built it and kept it going these many years!
Did Twitter actually do anything in response to App.net?
App.net came out in 2012, and while I can't really remember the specific areas of discontent that I experienced with Twitter back then, here's an article I found:
http://thenextweb.com/twitter/2013/01/14/twitter-in-2012/
I think what everyone was worried about back then was that Twitter was changing the nature of what Twitter was. Twitter started placing limits on API tokens, introduced new UI in the form of cards, which could also be used for ads, etc. There was a sense that the freedom and openness of the Twitter platform was quickly diminishing.
Twitter's response was basically no response, but in a good way. They slowed down making those sorts of radical changes, and to this day you can still browse Twitter with a 3rd-party app like TweetBot and never see cards or ads.
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It didn't need to. App.net was a "success" at first because the bigshots from the tech twitter-sphere all jumped over.
Problem was none of them actually stopped posting on Twitter, at best they just set app.net to mirror their Twitter never really engaging with the network because none of them were willing to give up their high follower counts they had from being early adopters of Twitter.
Too much ego to put up with the BS from twitter, yet also too much ego to give up their high follower counts.
No.
It provided a check? How?
If people were dissatisfied with Twitter, they could leave and join App.net. If enough people did this and App.net reached critical mass, it could have become the default service of its kind.
Since the primary motivation for people switching to App.net was them getting upset at Twitter, they slowed down the frequency and breadth of the changes they were making to their service so as to upset fewer people and less frequently. In the end, this was a positive outcome for users that liked Twitter exactly the way it used to be and didn't want it to change.
Of course, Twitter's changes may not have been motivated by App.net at all, but even if not there was still an escape hatch for users if things got too bad.
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This seems like a good juncture to point out that GNU Social, OStatus, and the Fediverse still exist.
It still has some believers. Someone wrote a new implementation in Ruby called Mastodon recently, which has a nice interface.
I still think back periodically to https://github.com/buckket/twtxt. Fascinating project.
Do you know of a good tutorial on how to quickly get set up on one of these? I would gladly join but have never really been able to figure out how.
(I'm looking to self host.)
I would assume it's just a case of installing your chosen software package on a web server. I don't know how easy that is. The more mature packages are probably better-documented in this regard.
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For GNU Social, set up a ServerPilot stack on Ubuntu (it's a PHP/MySQL app and the ServerPilot stack works a-okay for this).
For Mastodon, deploy their Docker image?
The following are a little dated now, but still relevant:
* https://www.codeword.xyz/2015/09/27/self-hosting-gnu-social/
* https://code.tutsplus.com/tutorials/revisiting-open-source-s...
App.net and Medium have the same issue (why advertising is more lucrative than selling blogging software directly to content creators):
Let's say for every one content creator that are on average 100 eyeballs on the content they create (1:100). Almost universally, the 100 eyeballs can be translated to more economic value than the 1, and hence why the advertising model is so lucrative.
App.net from what I understand wasn't so much trying to sell to content creators as it was trying to create a Social-Graph-As-A-Service thing. I thought the original pitch was essentially two fold:
build your network with App.net and users can basically just opt-in automagically importing their data from other App.net networks thereby reducing the friction and hopefully making it easier to over come the ghost-town problem.
build your network with App.net and tool makers (including you) automatically get a well defined/robust/tested API to write apps against to interact with your network.
The advertising model is "lucrative" because that's where all the money is shunted, because that's what MarCom knows how to do. There's a century and a half of advertising agencies who need to capitalize on their training, and the newspaper/TV model is what we've gotten for it.
Unfortunate. Goes to show that you really can't break even without ads or selling/analysing data with a centralised social network.
or put another way, "people don't want to pay for most things"
Or to put it another way, people care more about money than their own privacy.
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Personally, I always wanted to see a site that has ads and is free to read, but charges a small fee to create an account - just to see if it would help reduce trolling and sock puppets.
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Some variant of Sturgeon's Law?
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you really can't break even without ads or selling/analysing data with a centralised social network
I don't think we actually know that as a fact, it's just that not much else has been tried.
I find cloud feadreader aren't that different at least from the view point of a passive reader. They seem to be profitable, by restricting free features. Like: only x feeds free to aggregate and a ~15 minute delay of all feeds. Search is also a pro feature. I also have the feeling twitter is extremely over engineered.
I applaud Dalton and Bryan for keeping ADN running for nearly 3 years after it ceased development. In truth, I think most of the users left back in May 2014, but it's still admirable that they kept it running.
If you'll excuse the self-plug, I wrote about the death of ADN back in 2014 and re-reading my post, I think it holds up.
http://mashable.com/2014/05/08/app-net-potential/#P8.bAcE8NO...
I wonder how many people thought app.net was a Microsoft product.
Yeah, the name is confusing. It's like a pizza place named "Waffle Irons Direct".
Always felt like a case where they bought the domain name for another reason then one day decided to build a twitter clone.
Branding wise is made absolutely no sense.
I thought it's some kind of app store for android phones. Not sure why I made this association. But I guess their name might be one of the reasons of failure. It's simple and short, but doesn't really tell anything about the product.
Any association with the SharePoint people could and should doom a social network product. Or any product.
I like to call it ShamePoint. Nobody can possibly be proud of deploying that.
"We are also going to open-source the code behind App.net on our GitHub page."
Huge kudos for that.
I have the experience, that services with generic sounding domain names are never successfull. The only remotely successfull generic sounding domain site that I can think of is about.com
There are some exceptions, like messenger.com which I don't think is a counter-example. I think that messenger.com would be no-more or less successfull if it was named barf.com. People use it because facebook already has a foothold.
For those not in the know, what was app.net?
Twitter for $50/year
So a social network? weird name for a social network.
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App.net combined two big ideas:
1. Social networks are important enough that a subscription model is viable
2. Social networks should be built on a platform for social network applications
Obviously neither idea could save app.net. Which idea caused most of the problems?
#1, but not inherently as much as for the effect it had on the consequences of other decisions: they launched with a hard pay-wall for the first couple years and that made the identity crisis fatal. They got a good deal of initial publicity but the first thing anyone curious got was a requirement that they pay to use it. That's always going to be a hard sell but it was especially bad when the messaging was so confused about whether it was a platform to build apps on, a Twitter competitor, etc. since the cost was real and up-front but any benefits were largely hypothetical based on enough other people deciding to pay at all and some of them building apps.
I think a subscription model could be viable with better execution but it really seems like that would be best with a tiered approach so the social network wasn't held back by the payment requirement.
I think your diagnosis is on target: "the cost was real and up-front but any benefits were largely hypothetical based on enough other people deciding to pay at all and some of them building apps."
But freemium is hard: Either you make a market for ads, and have intrusive data collection and analytics, and you have to compete with the most intrusive ad-supported products that already dominate the ad market and you become as bad as them, OR you have pure freemium and you have the question of how to make the up-sell compelling enough while keeping the free level of service interesting enough. The only good example of success at freemium is LinkedIn where they segmented their user population and only made the recruiters pay a very high premium price.
I suspect 1 is the big turnoff. It's really hard to make people pay for something they can get for free, with a better perceived value. App.net promised to have value in the future, but demanded payment upfront. Twitter offers immediate value without demanding any form of payment.
I sort of agree. App.net lacked value at launch because of the way it intended to build value - through apps on it's platform. That's inevitably slow just when you need to build take-off momentum, and there is no way to "prime the pump" except by throwing money at the problem and hoping you get the right apps.
Moreover, Twitter has a problem with churn. It's free to start, but baffling for many, and troll-infested if you stick around. All ad-supported social networks have that problem plus the invasiveness issue.
https://app.net/
When a service shuts down, it'd be really nice of them to keep a mention of wth they were doing on their frontpage.
https://alpha.app.net/ has info
Still a good domain name. MS might be interested.
And then they launch a free platform, integrated with Windows 10 and Cortana, that competes directly with Twitter...
Building developer platforms is fun and exciting. Especially for the developers creating it, knowing that they are building a rockstar application for people just like them. Getting adoption and conversion to paying customers is so freaking hard and ultimately the end of the road.
I went down this road once (http://www.odatahq.com/) and loved every minute of it. I still look at what we made and find true joy in it. But the end game was typical of most developer platforms ...
I feel strange that this is the first time I've ever heard of app.net. I assumed it was something Microsoft related, apparently not. I suspect the combination of these things is why this failed.
Doomed to fail from the beginning. Horrible name which was leeched from Microsoft, and Twitter was clearly already so far ahead. AND THEY WANT ME TO PAY?
Really loved and appreciated what Dalton, Berg, and the team was able to build. It was an awesome community for quite a while. Great job and sorely missed.
IIRC YC had a bet in the subscription social network space for "family social networks." That has obvious problems with the growth model, similar to but different from Path which had an arbitrary limit on individuals' number of "true friends." Path was taking the word "friend" too literally. That got pivoted and/or rolled up. Where is it now?
Shutdown date according to https://alpha.app.net/: March 15, 2017.
Shutdown date according to http://blog.app.net/2017/01/12/app-net-is-shutting-down/: March 14, 2017.
Which date is correct?
Depends on which side of the International Date Line you are.
Laughing tears emoticon, a few times! :D
So... who gets the domain?
My thought exactly! Always loved the domain. :)
MMW : This domain will be sold a fortune.
I was an earlier user and still active to this day and it's sad but not unexpected to see them go. Their approach towards social networking business model was still a valuable experiment.
The difference, as always, seems to be user adoption and funding.
You need both for your project to succeed. This should not be underestimated.
The nice thing is that if your platform is decentralized, hosting is a non-issue and you just have to focus on adoption.
"give it ample time to bake" that was the strategy? having it sell itself?
They did try to sell it for a couple of years but by that point in 2014 I think they had essentially given up already. But the revenue was covering the hosting costs so it seemed sensible to just leave it going, and leave possibilities open.
as an entrepreneur, you should know when it's time to let go. either you continue the start-up a.k.a the experiment, and try to iterate towards a more successful direction - or you shut it down. I think standstill at such a point is really the worst of all options.
Good luck to Caldwell. It would be interesting to read his account on what he would do better if he could do it all over.
I wonder if the code base that they open source will become the basis for another decentralized social network?
They have said they will be open-sourcing the codebase. But it doesn't appear to up on their Github yet : https://github.com/appdotnet
If the launch would have been more humble maybe this wouldn't be such a spectacular failure.
They were trying to solve a problem, with a copy of the problem. Not surprised really.
You mean copy of failed solution to the problem.
Is app.net some social network? Why the name 'app.net' ?
App.net'S failures, IMO, were not a result of being too early as Dalton suggests. Instead, they failed at building a company. Confusing branding, wrong messaging, and ultimately a product without a need. That's why app.net failed.
https://arielmichaeli.com/where-did-app-net-go-wrong-bb4326a...
less than 50000 downloads in Android and 60 reviews in AppStore in 5 years. I think you can get better numbers without marketing.
Seriously, whatever you do, you need to spend the same amount of time promoting it, otherwise no one will notice. 50000 downloads is nothing in 5 years, it is 2.7 users a day. If you are in SanFrancisco you can get more than 3 downloads a day just going to the street and talking with strangers.
And they got 2.5M in their series A. https://index.co/company/AppDotNet?utm_source=thenextweb.com
Where were their budget for marketing? At least I would have expected 500k in marketing and 1$ per install, them we can talk about the users not liking the product or whatever.
UPDATE: you can keep downvoting (I would appreciate a feedback comment to explain the downvote) but it doesn't change the fact that marketing is more important than the product and they didn't spend on it
I don't mean to pick on you, but this is getting tiring for me. When you say 'marketing' you mean advertising and promotion, because product definition is part of marketing. Sizing up the market and determining what to build is marketing (inbound), advertising and promotion is also marketing (outbound). I realize these definitions have been in flux, but I'm talking traditional MBA definitions. I feel a lot nuance is being lost on people who believe marketing is a sophisticated-sounding term for advertising and promotion.
> I don't mean to pick on you, but this is getting tiring for me. When you say 'marketing' you mean advertising and promotion, because product definition is part of marketing.
Well, you shouldn't judge me so fast. I have an MBA with marketing and I have been working on marketing for some time in my life. So I am aware what a marketing plan involves, and promotion is a small portion of it. I cannot suppose the founders knew all about marketing, but I would expect them to spend some money in promotion even if it not wise money.
Maybe you like this more. You have to do some marketing: define your product, know your users, define your goals, find the channels where your users are, target them, promote your product to those users in those channels, measure the results, analyze what happened and rinse and repeat. (that was also a small definition because marketing is still more)
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Never heard of it
I'm a pretty active lurker on HN and I really had to think hard about what App.net was and why I might care. I think that is an indicator of why they might have had a hard time surviving. Even hardcore nerds didn't know about it so I really don't expect "normal" people to know about it. :(
This reeked of being dead the day it launched, so it's hardly surpising, but it's also tragic.
Why is it so hard to create a Twitter alternative that's popular and effective? Does the world tend to gravitate towards single standards for these things, like Facebook, HTTP or email?
Network effects, and the existing services being "good enough"
Yeah basically that. People don't want extensible services or open platforms. They don't want full control over their data. They don't want 100% privacy. These are all niche things that like less than 1% of people want. Most people just want a thing that does one basic job and does it good enough.
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"Network effects" on the WWW are artificial. We need to update our laws so that neither users nor developers can be punished for using any non-disruptive browsing device. A browsing device is anything that consumes data and shows it to users later.
Little guys like App.net won't stand much of a chance against the behemoths until the U.S. legalizes competition against the tech cartels.
Once that happens, sites like App.net and Twitter can compete on an even footing, and consumers will be free to choose services based on merit rather than lock-in.
It's rare to see a service as entrenched as Twitter get displaced unless it's just not Good Enough in some capacity.
It's possible that if Twitter crumples under the weight of the abuse, if it becomes nothing but a dead sea of trolls, that we'll see a successful replacement.
Until then, muddle on!
This is one of the big problems App.net always had, in that it wasn't at all intended to be a "Twitter alternative". Alpha was supposed to be an example of what could be built on the platform, not the entire product itself.
Surprise! Gimmicky non-solution that ignores reality vaporizes into thin air. Who couldv'e seen that coming?
We've banned this account for posting only uncivilly or unsubstantively.
Can I have my $75 back?
Kinda ominous that the main Twitter alternative right now is GAB.
It's only a Twitter alternative if people I care about will read what I write, or I can read what people I care about write.
Until most of the publishers are dual-publishing (or migrated), or most of the readers are dual-reading (or migrating), it's not an alternative.
GAB is a niche Twitter alternative.
the main alternative is facebook if the use case is media comsumption. if the use case is following experts in your industry its just feedly or rss
Not even close.
What's that?
Twitter for the alt-right, it seems. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gab_(social_network)
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