Comment by tialaramex

7 years ago

Actual public Certificate Authorities have done this too.

You request a cert, it's authorized everything seems fine. Except, huh, the guy who was supposed to authorize is off sick today, how did that work? The email to the authorizer should just be sat in his INBOX until he gets back.

Oh - the company's "Malware protection" system automatically dereferenced the "Do you want to issue this certificate?" link from the email and there was no second step. So for affected companies basically anybody could request any certificate in their domains and it would get issued.

As far as I remember nobody has proof any bad guys ever used this, but grey hats posted some fun they had with it. Likewise for a CA that decided to OCR the images from an unco-operative DNS hierarchy that wouldn't provide machine readable data to them. Grey hats obtained domain names that confused the OCR into allowing them to get certs for other people's names. Did any black hats do it? We have no proof.

Any chance you could provide articles on these grey hat activities? Sounds interesting

  • For the OCR one the combination of "WHOIS" and "OCR" found me this thread from 2016 with an incident report from Comodo's Robin Alden:

    https://www.mail-archive.com/dev-security-policy@lists.mozil...

    Alas I wasn't able to bring to mind a combination of keywords that would find the other incident in public archives, and I know it's from my background reading so it will be before my personal archives of these discussions begin. Sorry.