Comment by fragmede

Security is one of them.

When RPM-GPG-EXAMPLE and example.rpm are both coming from https://example.com it's less clear. When example.com is coming from a mirror repository, or being emailed around (yes, this happens), package signing asserts that example.rpm was signed by the signatures in RPM-GPG-EXAMPLE, which has a strong (but not bullet-proof) connection as being built by example.com.

From that example, we can see that package signing also protects from someone who's able to break into the main example.com webserver but not example.com's build system - if the attackers did not get into the build system and example.rpm has a valid signature then despite the webserver being broken, the rpm file can still be trusted, assuming the webserver did not have a copy of the private key used for build signing. If we loaded https://example.com/RPM-GPG-EXAMPLE before the webserver was broken into, and then the webserver was broken into and a malicious RPM-GPG-EXAMPLE and example.rpm were uploaded, it would be noticed. (Examining changes to RPM-GPG-EXAMPLE are, unfortunately, left to the reader as an exercise.)

Still, while it's true that loading the file from https://example.com/RPM-GPG-EXAMPLE relies on TLS, but there are methods available to confirm that the file's contents are valid, that don't rely on TLS, if the security folk at example.com are doing their job.

Finally, TLS is not an all or nothing game. Or rather, the certificate used to sign the https connection does not have to be blindly trusted, and in the case of sketchy root certificates, even if https://example.com loads fine in a web browser, it does not mean it should necessarily be trusted. Certificate Transparency (eg crt.sh) is a proper lever when working with example.com.

Security is complicated and there are no silver bullets.

`curl | sudo bash` is batshit though.