Comment by bondarchuk
3 years ago
Even when you phrase it that way, you would seem to posit that an experience has a how it is. How something is is ultimately a judgment made by an experiencing subject. In that case, doesn't the question of comparing two "how it is"-judgments regarding experiences of different subjects become incoherent? On the one hand it implies a single experiencer who has two experiences and compares them, but on the other hand we already know that the two experiences we want to compare have different experiencers.
So (forgive me if I'm projecting too much on your particular phrasing :)) here we are still subtly relying on an implied "thing"-ness of an experience, namely as an object which can be extracted out of its original subject and transposed onto another subject.
I feel like you're being purposefully obtuse to not be able to say the human experience is fundamentally different than a bat's experience, even if it's difficult to articulate a bat's unique experience in a human language.
Edit: let me expound on that, as I'm not just being difficult. What does this questioning actually get you? The question of how a bat experiences the world vice a human gives me a meaningful thought experiment about what is consciousness and what the limits of our perceptions are. Asking whether or not the words are meaningful gives me nothing because the meaning of the article is so intuitively clear. In other words, questioning whether the words have meaning leads to a less meaningful experience vice using my intuition to understand the meaning to my interpretation.
For me, the point is not to avoid having to admit some kind of difference between human and bat experience (clearly they are different!). But I feel like the fact that this question ("what is it like to be a bat?") is hard (or even impossible) to answer is used in support of the thesis that there is something non-physical about human experience. By analyzing what this question really means in a technical and rigorous sense (and if it's even a coherent question at all), I only want to push back against it insofar as it is used to support that conclusion.
It actually supports the opposite conclusion for me, the fact that physical differences causes experiential differences suggests experience, and therefore consciousness has a physical basis.