Comment by thomastjeffery
3 years ago
The best attempt at thought monopoly I can think of is religion. Even that is a general failure: no single religious narrative has ever stood constant. They have all evolved through the participation of their adherents. There is no one true Christianity: there are hundreds.
I most certainly do mean to call out copyright as willful, but it's not a deception, at least not a successful one: everyone knows it is false. That's why it's enforced by law! Instead of people being deceived, people must instead pretend to be so. Each of us must behave as if the very concept of Micky Mouse is immortal and immutable; and if we don't, the law will punish accordingly.
Every film on Netflix, every song on Spotify, etc. can obviously be copied any number of times by any number of people at any place on Earth. We are all acutely aware of this fact, but copyright tells us, "Pretend you can't, or get prosecuted."
So is it truly effective? Millions of people are not playing along. Millions of artists are honestly trying to participate in this market, and the market is failing them. Is that because we need more people to play along? Rightsholders like the MPAA say that piracy is theft, and that every copy that isn't paid for is a direct cost to their business. How many of us are truly willing to pretend that far?
What if we all just stopped? Would art suddenly be unprofitable for everyone, including the lucky few who turn a profit today? I don't believe that for a second.
The only argument I have ever heard in favor of copyright is this: Every artist deserves a living. I have seen time and time again real living artists fail to earn a living from their copyright. I have seen time and time again real living artists share their work for free, choosing to make their living by more stable means.
Every person living deserves a living. Fix that, and we will fix the problem copyright pretends to solve, and more.
> I most certainly do mean to call out copyright as willful, but it's not a deception, at least not a successful one: everyone knows it is false.
Unless I'm misunderstanding you, this is not even wrong. What about copyright law is empirically false? Such a question is non-sensical.
Your comment redefines the word "false" in a way that muddles understanding. You aren't alone -- some philosophers do this -- but it tends to confuse rather than clarify. I've developed antibodies for language abuse of this kind. Such language can even have the effect of making language charged and divisive.
Many people understand the value of using the words _true_ and _false_ to apply to the assessment of _facts_. This is a useful convention. (To be clear, I'm not opposed to bending language when it is useful.)
To give a usage example: a misguided law is not _false_. Such a statement is non-sensical. We have clear phrases for this kind of law, such poorly designed, having unintended consequences, etc. We could go further and say that a law is i.e. immoral or pointless. You are likely making those kinds of claims. By using those phrases, we can have a high-bandwidth conversation much more quickly.
The very concept that a thing cannot be copied. That is the obvious falsehood that we are compelled to pretend is true.
I don't see how any of that is muddled. I'm being as direct as I can with my words here. I'm talking about the very plain fact that art can be copied freely.
For example, DRM software gives you encrypted content and the decryption key. Why bother? Because the end user is expected to pretend they are only able to use that decryption key once. This is patently false, but any user who decides not to play along is immediately labeled a "pirate". What vessel have they commandeered? The metaphorical right to copy. What will be enshrined in law next, the rights to hear and to see?
Copyright law is poorly designed. It does have unintended consequences. It is immoral and pointless. To back these claims, all I must to do is show the absurdity that copyright is on the face of it.
> The very concept that a thing cannot be copied. That is the obvious falsehood that we are compelled to pretend is true.
No, copyright law does _not_ compel us to believe that things cannot be copied. Instead, it establishes consequence of illegal copying. I'm flabbergasted that you, so far, don't recognize a simple and foundational difference between "can" and "should".
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> Every film on Netflix, every song on Spotify, etc. can obviously be copied any number of times by any number of people at any place on Earth. We are all acutely aware of this fact, but copyright tells us, "Pretend you can't, or get prosecuted."
I see the dark arts of rhetoric used here, and it is shameful. The portion I quoted above is incredibly confused. I would almost call it a straw man, but it is worse than that.
Copyright law says no such thing. Of course you _could_ copy something. Copyright law exists precisely because you can do that. The law says i.e. "if you break copyright law, you will be at risk of a sufficiently motivated prosecutor."
The comment above suffers from much rhetoric to serve as a good jumping off point. For those interested, I would recommend the following two articles:
## "Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law" by Stewart E. Sterk
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article...
> Why give authors an exclusive right to their writings? Copyright rhetoric generally offers two answers. The first is instrumental: copyright provides an incentive for authors to create and disseminate works of social value. By giving authors a monopoly over their works, copyright corrects for the underincentive to create that might result if free riders were permitted to share in the value created by an author's efforts. The second answer is desert: copyright rewards authors, who simply deserve recompense for their contributions whether or not recompense would induce them to engage in creative activity.
> The rhetoric evokes sympathetic images of the author at work. The instrumental justification for copyright paints a picture of an author struggling to avoid abandoning his calling in order to feed his family. By contrast, the desert justification conjures up a genius irrevocably committed to his work, resigned - or oblivious - to living conditions not commensurate with his social contributions. The two images have a common thread: extending the scope of copyright protection relieves the author's plight.
> Indeed, the same rhetoric· - emphasizing both incentives and desert - consistently has been invoked to justify two centuries of copyright expansion. Unfortunately, however, the rhetoric captures only a small slice of contemporary copyright reality. Although some copyright protection indeed may be necessary to induce creative activity, copyright doctrine now extends well beyond the contours of the instrumental justification. ...
## "Copyright Nonconsequentialism" by David McGowan
Missouri Law Review. https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art...
> This Article explores the foundations of copyright law. It tries to explain why those who debate copyright often seem to talk past each other. I contend the problem is that copyright scholars pay too much attention to instrumental arguments, which are often indeterminate, and too little to the first principles that affect how one approaches copyright law.
> Most arguments about copyright law use instrumental language to make consequentialist arguments. It is common for scholars to contend one or another rule will advance or impede innovation, the efficient allocation and production of expression, personal autonomy, consumer welfare, the "robustness" of public debate, and so on.' Most of these instrumental arguments, though not quite all of them, reduce to propositions that cannot be tested or rejected empirically. Such propositions therefore cannot explain existing doctrine or the positions taken in debate.
> These positions vary widely. Consumer advocates favor broad fair use rights and narrow liability standards for contributory infiringement; producer advocates favor the reverse.' Most of the arguments for both consumers and producers prove too much. It is easy to say that the right to exclude is needed to provide incentives for authors. It is hard to show that any particular rules provide optimal incentives. It is easy to point to deviations from the model of perfect competition. It is hard to show why these deviations imply particular rules.
> ...
Correction: "The comment above suffers from _too_ much rhetoric"