Comment by giantg2
1 year ago
This might hide identity from the person requesting the info, but not from the trusted authority. In theory the authority could collect data on where requests are coming from, or where the certs are used. To my knowledge, there's no way to completely hide identity while also verifying an attribute and ownership.
There are actually ideas using crypto to provide proof of properties without a trusted entity having to know what the proof will be used for, and without the requester of the proof being able to learn more about the identity. E.g. (in french) https://linc.cnil.fr/demonstrateur-du-mecanisme-de-verificat...
Now i think it is still either a dangerous slope, or it will end up inefficient, because of credential sharing; the typical modern idea to avoid that is to require the user to have a locked smartphone, wich is quite an intrusive requirement.
This is close. But I believe an attacker could use the signature to tie it back to a user if the gain access to the trusted authority information. There's no way to do it truly anonymously. Even the article recognized its pseudonymous.
It does hide identity from all parties except the party you decide to share your identity with.
Here's the technical details on how that is achieved: https://cipheredtrust.com/doc/#pki-id-anchoring
I don't see anything in that link explaining how one could verify age while remaining anonymous to all parties. How does one verify the age is correct and associated with the true person? It also seems the cert is for specific sites. So doesn't that mean the identity provider (trust anchor?) who verified the age now has a list of which sites you're using your certs on sinc eyou must define a reciever (recipient domain?)? Maybe you can explain the flow in an example?
>So doesn't that mean the identity provider (trust anchor?) who verified the age now has a list of which sites you're using your certs on sinc eyou must define a reciever (recipient domain?)? Maybe you can explain the flow in an example?
When a trust anchor does verification and issue you the certificate, you get a PEM file, their connection to the process is done. Yes they know who you are but can't track what you do with the certificate after they issue it to you.
On the other hand if you were to use that certificate to commit a crime, the signature will provide access to the trust chain, thus law enforcement could use it to find you by reaching out to the issuer. This is a feature not a bug, it combines privacy and accountability, no different from conventional non-digital world expectations.
The use of receiver id, happens after you have the certificate, the issuer is not involved. The receiver id is for the benefit of the receivers of signatures from your certificate, it allows them establish a sticky anonymous cryptographic identity for you without knowing who you are, this is a way again to have privacy while having accountability. This demo touches on the approach: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=92gu4mxHmTY
Reach me via my profile if you're interested in knowing more.
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