Comment by gigel82

2 years ago

No amount of remote attestation and "transparency logs" and other bombastic statements like this would make up for the fact that they are fully in control of the servers and the software. There is absolutely no way for a customer to verify their claims that the data is not saved or transferred elsewhere.

So unless they offer a way for us to run the "cloud services" on our own hardware where we can strictly monitor and firewall all network activity, they are almost guaranteed to be misusing that data, especially given Apple's proven track record of giving in to government's demands for data access (see China).

> No amount of remote attestation and "transparency logs" and other bombastic statements like this would make up for the fact that they are fully in control of the servers and the software. There is absolutely no way for a customer to verify their claims that the data is not saved or transferred elsewhere.

You are right. Apple is fully in control of the servers and the software, and there is no way for a customer to verify Apple's claims. Nevertheless system transparency is a useful concept. It can effectively reduce the number of things you have to blindly trust to a short and explicit list. Conversely it forces the operator, in this case Apple, to explicitly lie. As others have pointed out, that is quite a business risk.

As for transparency logs, it is an amazing technology which I can highly recommend you take a look at in case you don't know what it is or how it works. Check out transparency.dev or the project I'm involved in, sigsum.org.

> they are almost guaranteed to be misusing that data

That is very unlikely because of the liability, as others have pointed out. They are making claims which the Apple PCC architecture helps make falsifiable.

> There is absolutely no way for a customer to verify their claims that the data is not saved or transferred elsewhere.

Transparency logs are capable of verifying that, it's more or less the whole point of them. (Strictly speaking, you can make it arbitrarily expensive to fake it.)

Also, if they were "transferring your data elsewhere" it would be a GDPR violation. Ironically wrt your China claim, it would also be illegal in China, which does in fact have privacy laws.

  • Are transparency logs akin to Certificate Transparency but for signed code? I’ve read through the section a couple times and still don’t fully understand it.

    • Yeah, it's a log of all the software that runs on the server. If you trust the secure boot process then you trust the log describes its contents.

      If you don't trust the boot process/code signing system then you'd want to do something else, like ask the server to show you parts of its memory on demand in case you catch it lying to you. (Not sure if that's doable here because the server has other people's data on it, which is the whole point.)

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  • That makes no sense at all. They control the servers and services entirely; they can choose to emit whatever logs they want into the "transparent logs" and then emit whatever else they don't want into non-transparent logs.

    Even if they were running open source software with cryptographically verified / reproducible builds, it's still running on their hardware (any component or the OS / kernel or even hardware can be hooked into to exfiltrate unencrypted data).

    Companies like Apple don't give a crap about GDPR violations (you can look at their "DMA compliance" BS games to see to what extent they're willing to go to skirt regulations in the name of profit).

    • > they can choose to emit whatever logs they want into the "transparent logs" and then emit whatever else they don't want into non-transparent logs.

      The log is publicly accessible and append-only, so such an event would not go un-noticed. Not sure what a non-transparent log is.

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    • > They control the servers and services entirely

      There's a key signing ceremony with a third-party auditor watching; it seems to rely on trusting them together with the secure boot process. But there are other things you can add to this, basically along the lines of making the machine continually prove that it behaves like the system described in the log.

      They don't control all of the service though; part of the system is that the server can't identify the user because everything goes through third party proxies owned by several different companies.

      > Companies like Apple don't give a crap about GDPR violations

      GDPR fines are 4% of the company's yearly global revenue. If you're a cold logical profit maximizer, you're going to care about that a lot!

      Beyond that, they've published a document saying all this stuff, which means you can sue them for securities fraud if it turns out to be a lie. It's illegal for US companies to lie to their shareholders.

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