Comment by sweeter

15 hours ago

This is just hypocrisy baiting, this isn't a real analysis at any level. They didn't bring ANY evidence for them to argue against, it was purely an opinion by the state that there could exist a threat, which again is not supported by evidence, true or not. America has a lot to gain by controlling tiktok and one American billionaire will become a lot richer, that's all there is to it. I mean both candidates used tiktok to campaign while wanting to ban it. It's just a ridiculous notion and even they know that.

"Oh you love hamburgers? Then why did you eat chicken last night? Hmmm, curious... You are obviously guilty"

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sweeter

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firesteelrain  15 hours ago

There was evidence and it was discussed in the ruling by the Supreme Court. Please read it.

For example, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-656_ca7d.pdf

Gorsuch pg 3

  • tveita  10 hours ago

    Assuming you mean this:

      According to the Federal Bureau
  of Investigation, TikTok can access “any data” stored in a
  consenting user’s “contact list”—including names, photos,
  and other personal information about unconsenting third
  parties. Ibid. (emphasis added). And because the record
  shows that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can require TikTok’s parent company “to cooperate with [its] efforts to obtain personal data,” there 
  is little to stop all that
  information from ending up in the hands of a designated
  foreign adversary. Id., at 696; see id., at 673–676; ante, at
  3. The PRC may then use that information to “build dossiers . . . for blackmail,” “conduct corporate espionage,” or advance intelligence operations.

    It basically just says that the app asks for the user's contact list, and that if the user grants it, the phone OS overshares information. That's really thin as evidence of wrong-doing. It doesn't even say that this capability is currently coded into the app. This sounds more like an Android/iOS problem - why is the contact sharing all or nothing? Would the ban still be OK if the app didn't have read contact permissions?

    • firesteelrain  8 hours ago

      It’s a great question. Gorsuch goes onto say

      "But before seeking to impose that remedy, the coordinate branches spent years in negotiations with TikTok exploring alternatives and ultimately found them wanting. Ante, at 4. And from what I can glean from the record, that judgment was well founded."

      Maybe that was one of the alternatives. I wasn’t on the task force but if I was asked to then I would have went one on one with their tech lead’s and asked them to stop collecting this.

      But it seems it is greater than that. How you interact with it, your likes and dislikes can be used as a fingerprint and against you.

      This fingerprint can then be used against firesteelrain some time in the prophetic future.

      Gorsuch says

      “To be sure, assessing exactly what a foreign adversary may do in the future implicates 'delicate' and 'complex' judgments about foreign affairs and requires 'large elements of prophecy.' Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948) (Jackson, J., for the Court). But the record the government has amassed in these cases after years of study supplies compelling reason“

      Then he says this.

      “ Consider some of the alternatives. Start with our usual and preferred remedy under the First Amendment: more speech. Supra, at 2. However helpful that might be, the record shows that warning users of the risks associated with giving their data to a foreign-adversary-controlled application would do nothing to protect nonusers’ data. 2 App. 659–660; supra, at 3. Forbidding TikTok’s domestic operations from sending sensitive data abroad might seem another option. But even if Congress were to impose serious criminal penalties on domestic TikTok employees who violate a data-sharing ban, the record suggests that would do little to deter the PRC from exploiting TikTok to steal Americans’ data. See 1 App. 214 (noting threats from “malicious code, backdoor vulnerabilities, surreptitious surveillance, and other problematic activities tied to source code development” in the PRC); 2 App. 702 (“[A]gents of the PRC would not fear monetary or criminal penalties in the United States”). The record also indicates that the “size” and “complexity” of TikTok’s “underlying software” may make it impossible for law enforcement to detect violations. Id., at 688–689; see also id., at 662. Even setting all these challenges aside, any new compliance regime could raise separate constitutional concerns—for instance, by requiring the government to surveil Americans’ data to ensure that it isn’t illicitly flowing overseas. Id., at 687 (suggesting that effective enforcement of a data-export ban might involve).”

      And the nail in the coffin is this

      “All I can say is that, at this time and under these constraints, the problem appears real and the response to it not unconstitutional. As persuaded as I am of the wisdom of Justice Brandeis in Whitney and Justice Holmes in Abrams, their cases are not ours. See supra, at 2. Speaking with and in favor of a foreign adversary is one thing. Allowing a foreign adversary to spy on Americans is another.”

      5 replies →

  • gunian  14 hours ago

    Can you link it here would be super grateful

    It's super interesting to see the custom code in TikTok not in Reels that can enable this not into politics but the algo would be cool to look at

dclowd9901  14 hours ago

Do they do this with other bans, like those against network hardware? Other countries sell their goods here at the American government's leisure. It's always been this way.