Comment by maqp
4 months ago
>The threat model is excellent, except: “The adversary can’t break standard cryptographic primitives”
>Let’s assume they can
Let's not.
The weak key sizes (<90 bits), broken primitives (SHA-1, MD5, DES), and weak modes of operation (ECB, unauthenticated CBC) are all known.
We know the Grover cuts symmetric key sizes in roughly half, and we know Shor will break classical asymmetric algorithms, so the industry is upping key sizes and moving into hybrid schemes that add post-quantum algorithms.
>non standard crypto models
Here's a thought: Submit your primitive (the rainstorm hash function) into the SHA-4 competition whenever it's due, and win it, or at least become a finalist. Then you don't have to sell it to serious projects as security through obscurity.
Surely you realize Briar is open source so the implementation of your hash function will be available to the attacker, and they can perform cryptanalysis on it to their heart's content? So you can't really get over the fact it needs attention from the professionals.
If you want to be taken seriously, maybe start by improving on attacks over existing algorithms? That distinguishes you from the random cranks who think they've come up with improved schemes.
It seems insufficiently secure to just trust that the people who designed the ciphers you use, and who also are responsible for breaking ciphers at state-level, would tell you if they could break those ciphers. Hahaha :)
Ok so you have no idea who's vetting the algorithms at competitions. It's the other participants. That's going to be you among others. You get to break apart all the competing algorithms that claim to be better than yours. And they get to show you if yours is the weaker one, as they also want to win the competition.
Sure, you can't put fox to guard the henhouse that's how you get stuff like DUAL_EC. But that's not the case in modern competitions. They are open to the public, and academic in nature. Everyone gets to analyze them.
We don't know who you are, what are your credentials, and we don't have any proof of you showing you have what it takes to analyze current standards, let alone create new primitives resistant to cryptanalysis. Until you decide go the long way, you'll find yourself treated as yet another Crown Sterling.
> It's the other participants.
Even better, it's the general public. Anyone who wants to can publish an analysis at any time, even after the competition ends. If someone published a practical attack against SHA-3 tomorrow the recommended standards would change overnight.
I love your enthusiasm for this, have a good weekend!