Comment by djoldman

3 months ago

From

https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/wiki/EJS

it looks like deno is recommended for these reasons:

> Notes

> * Code is run with restricted permissions (e.g, no file system or network access)

> * Supports downloading EJS script dependencies from npm (--remote-components ejs:npm).

It's fine for this project since google is probably not in the business of triggering exploits in yt-dlp users but please do not use deno sandboxing as a your main security measure to execute untrusted code. Runtime-level sandboxing is always very weak. Relying on OS-level sandboxing or VMs (firecracker & co) is the right way for this.

  • > It's fine for this project since google is probably not in the business of triggering exploits in yt-dlp

    yt-dlp supports a huge list of websites other than youtube

    • But YouTube is the only one that yt-dlp uses Deno for. No other website on yt-dlp's list has put up enough of a fight to merit an external JS runtime; only YouTube.

      From the September announcement:

      > The JavaScript runtime requirement will only apply to downloading from YouTube. yt-dlp can still be used without it on the other ~thousand sites it supports

  • I would not put it past them. And I'm not sure I trust the yt-dlp team to implement sandboxing securely. The codebase is already full of shortcuts that lead to vulnerabilities like file extension injection.

    I mean, this gives me pause:

    > Both QuickJS and QuickJS-NG do not fully allow executing files from stdin, so yt-dlp will create temporary files for each EJS script execution. This can theoretically lead to time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities.

    https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/wiki/EJS

    TOCTOU from temporary files is a solved problem.

  • > Runtime-level sandboxing is always very weak. Relying on OS-level sandboxing or VMs (firecracker & co) is the right way for this.

    ... Isn't the web browser's sandboxing runtime-level?

    • It used to be 100% runtime-level and it was the golden age of browser exploits. Each of your tabs are now a separate process that the OS sandboxes. They can only access a specific API over IPC for anything that goes beyond js/rendering (cookie management, etc...). An exploit in V8 today only gives access to this API. A second exploit is needed in this API to escape the sandbox and do anything meaningful on the target system.

    • Yes, but browser sandboxing is an absolute marvel of software design that also cost millions and millions of dollars in developers salaries and CVE bounties to develop. Neither Deno nor yt-dlp have anywhere close to millions of dollars to spend on implementing secure JS sandboxing.

    • Yes, and it's only reasonably secure because of years of exploits being found and fixed by some of the best (and very well-funded) software security engineers out there.

      3 replies →

For a long time, yt-dlp worked completely with Python. They implemented a lightweight JavaScript interpreter that could run basic scripts. But as the runtime requirements became more sophisticated it struggled to scale

  • As they put it, it was less of an interpreter, and more like 3 regexes in a trench coat.