Comment by Lerc
5 days ago
The prima facie case for free will* is that it feels free. If you can predict the action before the feeling it removes that argument (unless you want to invoke time travel as an option)
*one of the predominant characterisations of free will, anyway. I'm a compatiblist, so I have no issue with caused feelings of decision making being in conflict with free will. I also have a variation of Tourette's, so I have a different perception of doing things wilfully when compared to most people. It's really hard to describe how sometimes you can't tell if something was tic or not.
I don't see why having some latency in the path of free will makes it no longer free. Before my arm moves up, there is a motor neuron that fires that is always correlated with my arm moving up; doesn't that just mean the free will occurs earlier in the process than the motor neuron firing?
The signal preceding the feeling is not an argument against free will. It is an argument against the feeling of free will being evidence for free will.
There are a lot of things I feel that end up not being "real," like embarrassment, a failure. and anxiety. Why should free will not be like any of those?
Like how capsaicin makes food feel hot even when it isn't?
Yes, my point is that our senses often portray a reality that doesn't exist. Why should we assume free will is any different?
We don't even have a coherent and agreed upon definition. Every attempt at operationalizating it, results in it not being detectable. It's time we admit that there is no scientific basis for free will. It's not a scientific belief.
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Hm, but maybe you can predict the feeling before you can predict the action. Checkmate atheists :)
(for the record I am also a compatibilist)