Comment by vlovich123

5 days ago

I think the most practical reason not to flag which bugs are security bugs is to avoid helping blackhat hackers by painting a giant neon sign and that should be more than enough.

I think all the other explanations are just double-think. Why? If "bugs are just bugs" is really a true sentiment, why is there a separate disclosure process for security bugs? What does it even mean to classify a bug as a security bug during reporting if it's no different than any other bug report? Why are fixes developed in secret & potential embargoes sometimes invoked? I guess some bugs are more equal than others?

As mentioned in the article, every bug is potentially a security problem to someone.

If you know that something is a security issue to your organization, you definitely don't want to paint a target on your back by reporting the bug publicly with an email address <your_name>@<your_org>.com. In the end, it is really actually quite rare (given the size of the code base and the popularity of linux) that a bug has a very wide security impact.

The vast majority of security issues don't affect organizations that are serious about security (yes really, SELinux eliminates or seriously reduces the impact of the vast majority of security bugs).

  • The problem with that argument is that the reports don’t necessarily come from the organization for whom it’s an issue. Security researchers unaffiliated not impacted by any such issue still report it this way (eg Project Zero reporting issues that don’t impact Google at all).

    Also Android uses SELinux and still has lots of kernel exploits. Believing SELinux solves the vast majority of security issues is fallacious, especially since it’s primarily about securing userspace, not the kernel itself .

    • > The problem with that argument is that the reports don’t necessarily come from the organization for whom it’s an issue.

      You can already say that for the majority of the bugs being fixed, and I think that's one of the points: tagging certain bugs as exploitable make it seem like the others aren't. More generally, someone's minor issue might be a major one for someone else, and not just in security. It could be anything the user cares about, data, hardware, energy, time.

      Perhaps the real problem is that security is just a view on the bigger picture. Security is important, I'm not saying the opposite, but if it's only an aspect of development, why focus on it in the development logs? Shouldn't it be instead discussed on its own, in separate documents, mailing lists, etc by those who are primarily concerned by it?

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> I think the most practical reason not to flag which bugs are security bugs is to avoid helping blackhat hackers by painting a giant neon sign and that should be more than enough.

It doesn't work. I've looked at the kernel commit log and found vulnerabilities that aren't announced/ marked. Attackers know how to do this. Not announcing is a pure negative.

  • Linus argument against labeling some bugs, or even lack of features, as security vulnerabilities, is that all bugs can, with enough work and together with other circumstances, be a security vulnerability. Essentially every commit would need to be labeled as a cve fix, and then it’s just extra work for nothing.

    • > Linus argument against labeling some bugs, or even lack of features, as security vulnerabilities, is that all bugs can, with enough work and together with other circumstances, be a security vulnerability.

      This isn't true though. Some bugs are not exploitable, some are trivial to exploit. Even if sometimes we'd end up with a DoS that was actually a privesc, how does that make it pointless to label the ones we know are privescs as such?

      You can argue "oh no sometimes we mislabeled a DoS" but most of the time you can tell when something is going to be a powerful vuln or not ahead of time, I think this is a red herring to optimize around.

      > Essentially every commit would need to be labeled as a cve fix, and then it’s just extra work for nothing.

      This isn't true and has never been true for any other project. There are issues with the CVE system, this is not one of them. Note that the Linux kernel is the standout here - we don't have to guess about issues in the CVE system, we observe them all the time. "We need a CVE for every commit" is not one of them.