Comment by Muromec

5 hours ago

This kind of thing is generally used to disallow downgrading the bootloader once there is a bug in chain of trust handling of the bootloader. Otherwise once broken is forever broken. It makes sense from the trusted computing perspective to have this. It's not even new, it was still there on p2k motorollas 25 years ago.

You may not want trusted computing and root/jailbreak everything as a consumer, but building one is not inherently evil.

Trusted computing means trusted by the vendor and content providers, not trusted by the user. In that sense I consider it very evil.

  • If the user doesn't trust an operating system, why would they use it. The operating system can steal sensitive information. Trusted computing is trusted by the user to the extent that they use the device. For example if they don't trust it, they may avoid logging in to their bank on it.

    • > If the user doesn't trust an operating system, why would they use it.

      Because in the case of smartphones, there is realistically no other option.

      > For example if they don't trust it, they may avoid logging in to their bank on it.

      Except when the bank trusts the system that I don't (smartphone with Google Services or equivalent Apple junk installed), and doesn't trust the system that I do (desktop computer or degoogled smartphone), which is a very common scenario.

    • To trust an Android device, I need to have ultimate authority over it. That means freedom to remove functionality I don't like and make changes apps don't like. Otherwise, there are parts of practically every Android that I don't approve of, like the carrier app installer, any tracking/telemetry, most preinstalled apps, etc.

      I recently moved to Apple devices because they use trusted computing differently; namely, to protect against platform abuse, but mostly not to protect corporate interests. They also publish detailed first-party documentation on how their platforms work and how certain features are implemented.

      Apple jailbreaking has historically also had a better UX than Android rooting, because Apple platforms are more trusted than Android platforms, meaning that DRM protection, banking apps and such will often still work with a jailbroken iOS device, unlike most rooted Android devices. With that said though, I don't particularly expect to ever have a jailbroken iOS device again, unfortunately.

      Apple implements many more protections than Android at the OS level to prevent abuse of trusted computing by third-party apps, and give the user control. (Though some Androids like, say, GrapheneOS, implement lots that Apple does not.)

      But of course all this only matters if you trust Apple. I trust them less than I did, but to me they are still the most trustworthy.

    • Do you actually, bottom-of-your-heart believe that ordinary consumers think like this? They use TikTok and WhatsApp and Facebook and the Wal-Mart coupon app as a product of deep consideration on the web of trust they're building?

      Users don't have a choice, and they don't care. Bitlocker is cracked by the feds, iOS and Android devices can get unlocked or hacked with commercially-available grey-market exploits. Push Notifications are bugged, apparently. Your logic hinges on an idyllic philosophy that doesn't even exist in security focused communities.

A discussion you don't see nearly enough of is that there is a fundamental tradeoff with hardware security features — every feature that you can use to secure your device can also be used by an adversary to keep control once they compromise you.

  • Not only can, but inevitably is. Security folks - especially in mobile - are commonly useful idiots for introducing measures which are practically immediately coopted to take away users ability to control their device and modify it to serve them better. Every single time.

    We just had the Google side loading article here.

  • Fair enough, but so does your front door. Either thing is not smart enough to judge the legitimacy of ownership transitions.

    • Yeah, not disagreeing with you. It's just that, every time we have this discussion, we see comments like GP's rebutted by comments like yours, and vice versa.

      All I'm saying is that we have to acknowledge that both are true. And, if both are true, we need to have a serious conversation about who gets to choose the core used in our front door locks.

I’d like to think I’m buying the device, not a seat to use the device, at least if I do not want to use their software.

  • You can't have that with phones. You are always at the mercy of the hardware supplier and their trusted boot chain that starts with the actual phone processor (the one running GSM stuff, not user interface stuff). That one is always locked down and decides to boot you fancy android stuff.

    The fact that it's locked down and remotely killable is a feature that people pay for and regulators enforce from their side too.

    At the very best, the supplier plays nice and allows you to run your own applications, remove whatever crap they preinstalled and change to font face. If you are really lucky, you can choose to run practically useless linux distribution instead of practically useful linux distribution with their blessing. Blessing is a transient thing that can be revoked any time.

    • > You can't have that with phones.

      Why not?

      Obviously we don't have that. But what stops an open firmware (or even open hardware) GSM modem being built?

      1 reply →

    • The GSM processor is often a separate chip. You may have read an article about the super spooky NSA backdoor processor that really controls your phone, but it's just a GSM processor. Connecting via PCIe may allow it to compromise the application processor if compromised itself, but so can a broadcom WiFi chip.

    • Of course you can have that.

      The governments can ban this feature and ban companies from selling devices with that.