Comment by jandrewrogers

I find it interesting to contrast this with my experience flying out of China. I was taken to a private room and shown the digital colored X-ray of my bag on which a box had been drawn around an empty lighter, I was asked to remove it myself and hand it over, and I went on my way. All in under 5 minutes, no pat down, no fuss, and no one physically rifled through my belongings. (Granted I was a tourist so that might well not be typical.)

I'm not sure what their success rate is when tested by professionals but the experience definitely left me wondering WTF the deal with the TSA is.

> Correct. In the US, the TSA is just a government jobs program for the lowly skilled or unskilled.

This is oft repeated, but as a federal job, the bar is at least slightly higher than those typical AlliedUniversal/Andy Frain/Etc mall cop guards you see all over the place. I have no doubt that many are incompetent, but I think it is a big unfair that it gets singled out as a "jobs program" given that the bar is on the floor industrywide for security.

An interesting comparison would be FPS, which is the agency that does security checks for federal buildings, also under DHS same as TSA. They are armed despite many of them having an indoor only role (a few do patrol larger campuses outdoors). Thus, I suspect the requirements are somewhat higher. They are generally more thorough in my experience, except for one time where they did not notice one of my shoes got stuck and didn't go through the X ray, which is funny because they insist on all dress shoes being scanned as they have a tiny metal bar inside. The same shoes go through TSA just fine.

I routinely conceal large bottles of liquids on my person while going through airport security. I've probably gone through airport security in various places with a 1.5L bottle of water more than a hundred times now. Haven't been caught once, although of course the US-style scanners could presumably defeat this.

Same with hot sauces, perfume and the occasional bottles of wine. I really don't like to travel with a checked-in luggage, so this is a frequent problem.

Luckily I own lots of Rick Owens clothes with large hidden pockets.

> In the US, the TSA is just a government jobs program for the lowly skilled or unskilled. It's all security theater.

This matches my experience. I recently flew out of a small airport that flies 2 fairchild metro 23 turboprop planes up to 9 passengers. There were four TSA agents to check the 5 of us that were flying.

I don’t think it’s just the TSA tbh.

A couple of years before the pandemic I managed to make it all the way from London Heathrow to Auckland, New Zealand, passing through Dubai and Brisbane on the way, with one of those USB rechargeable plasma lighters and a Gerber multitool in my hand luggage.

Completely unintentional, of course, but due to #reasons I had packed in some haste and made the mistake of not completely unpacking my day sack, which I also used to carry my laptop for work, first.

I stayed in Auckland a couple of days and the items were eventually picked up on a scan before my flight to Queenstown. The guy was very nice about it: he had to confiscate the lighter, but he let me post the Multitool to my hotel in Queenstown.

A couple of years ago I did something similar flying out of Stansted but, that time, it was picked up at the airport and, again, I was able to get the items posted back to my home address.

Nowadays I always completely empty all compartments of all bags I’m taking before repacking, even when I’m in a hurry.

"In the US, the TSA is just a government jobs program for the lowly skilled or unskilled. It's all security theater."

Over here, it's G4S pork barrel contracts.

> the US, the TSA is just a government jobs program for the lowly skilled or unskilled.

I thought that was the US military?

TSA Is not great, I have been groped by TSA twice, I have never been pat down by any European airport staff

> It's all security theater.

It’s so much worse than that. Because the department of homeland security was formed in the panic following 911, many of the laws meant to protect our civil liberties (which have existed decades/centuries before the DHS was formed) haven’t been amended to explicitly apply to DHS staff as well.

So what ICE is doing right now could only happen with the loopholes that apply only to DHS staff.

So if not for the security theater of the TSA, Stephan Miller might not have had a mechanism to get the ball rolling on his murder squad that is ICE.

I'd believe that. I was in a situation where a bag started smoking _in the security checkpoint_ (it was a camera battery failing), and the TSA agents all abandoned the checkpoint. As a result, the FAA issued a full ground stop and had re-screen every passenger in the airport.

Any large organization is going to have some terrible employees.

TSA is much more skilled than the security people employed by the airlines that proceeded them.

While still theatre to a degree, that was 11 years ago.

> It's about making people feel safe.

I don't think that's a common perception of airport security. Few people take reassurance from it, most consider it a burden and hindrance that could stop them getting their flight if they don't perform the correct steps as instructed.

The lifting of this restriction is an example, the overwhelming response is "oh thank goodness, now I don't have to pay for overpriced water" and not "is this safe?"

A lot more people I've talked to about it say the theatre makes them feel uncomfortable and intimidated rather than making them feel safe. Airport security staff being so gruff and expecting people to know what to do (which casual travellers often don't), then not being able to properly explain what to do and shouting at people...

I really don't buy that the illusion of safety is high on anyone's priority list, it's more that a bureaucracy will grow as much as it can, employing more and more people who might not have better prospects, and no politicians want to be seen to be "comprimising people's safety" by cutting things back. Then "lobbying" from those selling equipment and detection machines probably helps everything keep going.

If it was actually cut back to a proper risk-assessed point of what's strictly necessary, people going thorugh would think "is this safe not having as much security" for about 30 seconds and then never think of it again.

> You're orders of magnitude more likely to die in a road accident, but people don't fear that. They fear terrorist attacks far more.

This can be traced to people in a car believe they can control whether they have an accident or not (and largely can). In an airplane, however, you have no control whatsoever.

> It's about making people feel safe.

I think this is true but had to be seen in the bigger context: the Bush administration wanted people to feel that there were threats which required sacrificing things like civil liberties, balanced budgets, or not being at war because if you didn’t fight them “over there” the nebulous “they” come here in a never-ending swarm. Even at the time we knew that the threats weren’t serious but the people making those decisions saw it as part of a larger agenda.

> It's about making people feel safe.

I think it is the opposite. It is supposed to be a visceral reminder that we are not safe, and therefore should assent to the erosion of civil liberties and government intrusions into our lives in the name of safety.

The government who wages the wars and brings its terrors home invades people's privacy and comfort in the small amount of time they have away from the toll they put to pay their taxes, and the people are thankful, after all, all of it is for their safety.

>It's about making people feel safe.

It adds stress. I fondly remember flying in the 80s vs today. Travelling back then was more chill.

> It's about making people feel safe.

My guess it's more about being able to say: 'We did everything we could.' If someone does end up getting a bomb on board. If they didn't do this, everyone would be angry and headlines would be asking: 'Why was nothing put in place to prevent this?'

I know literally nobody panicking from some idea of terrorist attack against airplane, this is not a thing in Europe. Neither my old parents, neither any of my colleagues etc. Its not 2001 anymore and even back then we were mostly chill.

But I can claim one thing for sure - people hate security checks with passion.

Airport security never makes me feel safe. It makes me feel violated and anxious.

I haven't really flown before 9/11, but I have used the subway in my city daily both before and after they installed metal detectors and started randomly asking people to put their bags through a scanner. I'm deeply nostalgic for not having to deal with this utter bullshit.

It reminds be of how after a fire at a tube station a lot of people decided to commute by motorbike because of fear of fire.

I seriously doubt that most people are happy with the tradeoffs of safety vs. convenience provided by the TSA. The general idea of x-ray, metal detectors, sure, that's all good. But the stuff with taking off your shoes, small containers of liquid, etc., no. I think if we reverted to a simpler system with fewer oddly specific requirements layered on top, most people would not feel significantly less safe, but would feel less inconvenienced.

One man's fear of safety is another man's job safety.

> You're orders of magnitude more likely to die in a road accident, but people don't fear that. They fear terrorist attacks far more.

On the contrary, a competent and responsible government should counter the hysteria, not enable it. It should protect citizens from car crashes rather than making a 18-lane highways through residential areas, and it should implement effective measures that reduce effective risk and panic regarding airline attacks, instead of pushing the fear even further with TSA.

It’s a $12 bn/yr production. I don’t think that’s perfectly acceptable. Let’s invest in loudspeakers if all we’re doing is shouting at people.

Yeah as we've seen with MH370, literally nothing stops the pilot from committing mass-murder-suicide at any point. We just need to trust that they're not feeling particularly depressed that day.

> You can't protect against an opponent who's motivated to learn the inherent vulnerabilities of our systems, many of which can't be protected against due to the laws of physics and practicality - short of forcing everyone to travel naked and strapped in like cattle, with no luggage. And even then, what about the extremist who works for the airline?

This is said as an axiom, but we have protected against the motivated terrorist, as shown by the safety record.

> You can't protect against an opponent who's motivated to learn the inherent vulnerabilities of our systems, many of which can't be protected against due to the laws of physics and practicality

Ah yes, the insidious opponent who learns the inherent vulnerability of ... huge crowds gathering before hand baggage screenings and TSA patdowns.

And these crowds are only there only due to a permanent immovable physical fixture of ... completely artificial barriers that fail to prevent anything 90-95% of the time.

One little know crazier example of how things linger around for decades is how the H1B program actually allowed for renewals of visa stamps within the US.

After 9/11 the only reason people were made to go to another country to do it is because the US State department wanted people 10 printed and face scanned at places that had the equipment to do them: the embassies outside the US.

Now all airlines are basically human cattle-herding boxes at 35K feet for the metaphorical H1B cows.

Lots has been written about this.

The post-9/11 freakout is a GREAT example of the syllogism "Something must be done! This is something, so we must do it!" -- IOW, a train of thought that includes absolutely no evaluation of efficacy.

Security expert Bruce Schneier noted, I believe, that the only things that came out of the post-9/11 freakout that mattered were (a) the reinforced cockpit door and (b) ensuring all the checked bags go with an actual passenger.

The ID requirement, for example, was a giveaway to the airlines to prevent folks from selling frequent-flier tickets (which was absolutely a common thing back then). (And wouldn't have mattered on 9/11 anyway, since all the hijackers had valid ID.)

to nitpick, the 100ml rule doesn't come from 9/11 but from 2006 attack attempts

That something could have been lawmakers going on major media saying, unequivocally, that flying is safe, warning not to give away freedoms lightly and even making a show of flying commercial themselves.

That something didn't have to include trading freedom for surveillance/inconvenience/increased exposure to poorly trained LEO's.

The world we live has been shaped more and more by the funders of certain politicians and major media to make us fearful of boogiemen. The payoff is increased surveillance and more authoritarian governments.

This illustrates a point though. TATP you could synthesize on a plane is entirely inadequate to bring down a plane. It also requires a bit more than acetone and hydrogen peroxide. Pan Am 103 required around half a kilo of RDX and TATP is very, very far from RDX.

The idea of synthesizing a proper high-explosive in an airplane lavatory is generally comical. The chemistry isn’t too complex but you won’t be doing it in an airplane lavatory.

there are other, very similar compounds in the same family that are indeed liquid.

Liquids are not explosive, they are assumed to be used to make explosives once onboard.

Regarding quantity, hard to find information, I guess they don't want to have a terrorist handbook to making explosives online, but I would assume that 100ml would mean multiple times this amount would not be enough to make an explosive large enough bring down an airplane.

In general, considering the overall cost of the measures, I would think that there is a valid reason and that "it does not make sense at first glance so it's just a security theater" does not hold.

I am not up-to-date on the bleeding edge but that explanation doesn’t seem correct? The use of x-rays in analytical chemistry is for elemental analysis, not molecular analysis. (There are uses for x-rays in crystallography that but that is unrelated to this application.)

At an elemental level, the materials of a suitcase are more or less identical to an explosive. You won’t easily be able to tell them apart with an x-ray. This is analogous to why x-ray assays of mining ores can’t tell you what the mineral is, only the elements that are in the minerals.

FWIW, I once went through an airport in my travels that took an infrared spectra of everyone’s water! They never said that, I recognized the equipment. I forget where, I was just impressed that the process was scientifically rigorous. That would immediately identify anything weird that was passed off as water.

Yes. The first step was upgrading to the new machines, now the size limits can be relaxed.

You have surprising faith that the system is well designed.

Malicious actors don't get as stressed as normal people who don't want to miss their flight about the long series of obviously pointless tests. Why would they?

And there isn't anyone who surveils the queues and takes the worried looking for further checks. This can happen around immigration checks. It happens for flights to Israel. But not in routine airport security.

> going over a series of long tests will elicit unusual (fear, stress) responses from malicious actors

Oh, man. Let me tell you what kind of response going over a series of long tests by armed authority figures elicits on normal good-intended people...

This kind of thinking is as legitimate as believing lie detectors work, i.e., not at all.

{{citation needed}}

Funnily enough, that’s also all the people who made the rules in the first place knew

Explosives that are inert liquid binaries aren't really a thing. That is something Hollywood invented out of whole cloth. The chemistry of explosives doesn't lend itself to such a form.

Chemical weapons often have liquid binary forms though.

>powerful enough to take down a plane

Is that the criteria used for restrictions? I don't actually know. I guess a firearm falls into that category. Does a wine corkscrew? A foam toy sword? A small fishhook? All items that are prohibited in the cabin

The same reason used for WA emissions inspections (since suspended). If your tailpipe emitted 99ppm of pollutants, you were good to go. If it emitted 100ppm, you had to get it fixed.

Good ole step functions.

You have to be able to fit those 10 100mL bottles into a single 1 quart resealable bag. At most you'd probably get about 9.46 of those 10 bottles in the bag but in practice it's fewer still.

1 US liquid quart is about 946.353 milliliters.

You can't, at least not where I live

This was done! It created terrible publicity incidents like the TSA forcing women to drink their own breast milk to prove it was safe. And not all liquids subject to this are things a person should swig even if they aren’t explosives. The extremely negative PR rightly stopped this practice.

People travel with liquids they don't intend to eat. Shampoo and all that.

There is also nothing that precludes explosives from being non-toxic. Presumably your demise is near if you are carrying explosives through security. What do you care about heavy metal poisoning at that point?

This happened due to a change in regulation in Europe.

Some airports, like AMS or MUC, invested on new machines with higher detection capabilities, and decided to allow all liquids and improve efficiency in boarding. The EU updated the rules claiming those new machines were still not sufficient and airports should go back to forbidding liquids.

It was a mess. I remember flying from MUC and being allowed all liquids and on my return flight, also from EU, when trying to fly with a normal water bottle, security people looked at me wondering what the f I was doing: "Don't you know liquids are not allowed, sir!?"

Schiphol has been very relaxed. I once had a water bottle with probably 200ml of water still in it in my bag. I was told to not do that again and they gave me the bottle back.

That's ok - 6cm blades are allowed. You can also carry it in a cabin luggage anyways.

realistically any broken glass bottle can be used as a blade.

...or be very anxious and resent air travel. I don't feel any safe through body searches, coupled with belt/coat removal, not wearing glasses and what not.

Personally, I don't know a single person who feels more secure due to the checks.

And to make some people richer.

Yes, peroxide chemistries famously don’t show up on a lot of explosive scans. TATP is an example but not the only one and far from the best one. They are largely missing from common literature because they are too chemically reactive to be practical e.g. they will readily chemically interact with their environment, including most metal casings you might put them in, such that they become non-explosive.

That aside, TATP is a terrible explosive. Weak, unstable, and ineffective. The ridicule is well-deserved.

That was just strawberry jam.

Sophisticated detonators are very small. The size is well below anything you’d be able to notice on an x-ray. Trying to detect detonators is an exercise in futility. Fortunately, a detonator by itself can’t do any damage.

Drones.

Backpack can have metal reinforcements that would make a proper weapon too, Same broken glass bottles and what not.

The entire point is futile and pointless.

You mean Tony didn't really make £20m in his first year out of office from just giving speeches? I mean, that's what his tax return says?

You, sir, are a _conspiracy theorist_. Don't let that rotating door catch you on the way back in.

> The harder you make it to down or hijack a plane, the fewer downed planes you will see.

You know that TSA fails in 90-95% of cases and that crowds before it are a much jucier target?