Comment by Spivak

4 hours ago

https://0pointer.net/blog/authenticated-boot-and-disk-encryp...

You. The money quote about the current state of Linux security:

> In fact, right now, your data is probably more secure if stored on current ChromeOS, Android, Windows or MacOS devices, than it is on typical Linux distributions.

Say what you want about systemd the project but they're the only ones moving foundational Linux security forward, no one else even has the ambition to try. The hardening tools they've brought to Linux are so far ahead of everything else it's not even funny.

This is basically propaganda for the war on general purpose computing. My user data is less safe on a Windows device, because Microsoft has full access to that device and they are extremely untrustworthy. On my Linux device, I choose the software to install.

  • What are you talking about? This has nothing to do with general purpose computing and everything to do with allowing you to authenticate the parts of the Linux boot process that must by necessity be left unencrypted in order to actually boot your computer. This is putting SecureBoot and the TPM to work for your benefit.

    It's not propaganda in any sense, it's recognizing that Linux is behind the state of the art compared to Windows/macOS when it comes to preventing tampering with your OS install. It's not saying you should use Windows, it's saying we should improve the Linux boot process to be a tight security-wise as the Windows boot process along with a long explanation of how we get there.

    • Secure boot is initialized by the first person who physically touches the computer and wants to initialize it. Guess who that is? Hint: it's not the final owner.

      It's only secure from evil maker attacks if it can be wiped and reinitialised at any time.

      1 reply →

Considering that (for example) your data on ChromeOS is automatically copied to a server run by Google, who are legally compelled to provide a copy to the government when subject to a FISA order, it is unclear what Poettering's threat model is here. Handwringing about secure boot is ludicrous when somebody already has a remote backdoor, which all of the cited operating systems do. Frankly, the assertion of such a naked counterfactual says a lot more about Poettering than it does about Linux security.