Comment by tptacek
7 hours ago
It seems pretty clear to me that the industry, and particularly the slice of the industry that operates large, important sites and staffs big security teams, doesn't believe this is a meaningful problem at all.
I agree with them.
Would this article not be evidence the part of the industry that makes up the CA/B Forum (i.e. CAs and Browsers) disagree?
Yeah but CAs want to sell you certificates, and browsers compete on their support for those certificates.
Huh? They really don't. It's actually kind of unfortunate that browsers don't have uniform policies about what certificates they accept, but for obvious reasons each browser wants to make their own decision.
The fact that it's 2026 and the CAs are only now getting around to requiring any CA to take DNSSEC, which has in its current form been operational for well over a decade, makes you take DNSSEC more seriously?
LetsEncrypt has been checking for DNSSEC since they launched 10+ years ago.
[1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555/#section-11.2
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Why dodge the question? Clearly they care today, and I live in today.
If we're doing to defer to industry, does only the opinion of website operators matter, or do browsers and CAs matter too? Browsers and CAs tend to be pretty important and staff big security teams too.
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Big sites don't have the same concerns as individual end users, in this case specifically about centralized servers surveilling DNS queries.
DNSSEC zone signing lets one resolve records without having to directly go through trusted (ie centralizing) nameservers. (If you run your own recursive resolver this just changes the set of trusted servers to the zones' servers).
I've made this argument in the context of your poo-pooing DNSSEC before, and I don't expect you to be receptive to it this time. Rather I just really wish I could get around to writing code to demonstrate what I mean.