It's not much better than nothing. It basically solves "I reused my password across sites" exclusively, that's it. If you're going to go through the effort of TOTP, it seems odd that you wouldn't just use a unique password.
If you use a unique password it's questionable if it adds any value at all. Perhaps in very niche situations like "password authentication is itself vulnerable due to a timing attack/ bug" or some such thing... but we've rarely seen that in the wild.
I use a password manager and systemically use long random passwords. An attacker would need to compromise my password manager, phish me, wrench me, or compromise the site the credential is associated with to get that.
Using local only TOTP (no cloud storage or portability for me, by choice) they would have to additionally phish me, wrench me, compromise my phone, or compromise my physical security to get the code.
None of these are easy except the wrench which is high risk. My password manager had standard features which make me more phishing resistant, and together they are more challenging than either apart. For example the fact that my password manager will not fill in the password on a non associated site means I am much less likely to fill in a TOTP code on an inappropriate site. Though there are vulnerable scenarios they aren't statistically relevant in the wild and the bar is higher regardless.
Now I happen to have a FIDO key which I use for my higher security contexts but I'm a fairly low value target and npm isn't one of my high security contexts. TOTP improves my security stance generally and removing it from npmjs.org weakened my security stance there.
It's not much better than nothing. It basically solves "I reused my password across sites" exclusively, that's it. If you're going to go through the effort of TOTP, it seems odd that you wouldn't just use a unique password.
If you use a unique password it's questionable if it adds any value at all. Perhaps in very niche situations like "password authentication is itself vulnerable due to a timing attack/ bug" or some such thing... but we've rarely seen that in the wild.
I disagree.
I use a password manager and systemically use long random passwords. An attacker would need to compromise my password manager, phish me, wrench me, or compromise the site the credential is associated with to get that.
Using local only TOTP (no cloud storage or portability for me, by choice) they would have to additionally phish me, wrench me, compromise my phone, or compromise my physical security to get the code.
None of these are easy except the wrench which is high risk. My password manager had standard features which make me more phishing resistant, and together they are more challenging than either apart. For example the fact that my password manager will not fill in the password on a non associated site means I am much less likely to fill in a TOTP code on an inappropriate site. Though there are vulnerable scenarios they aren't statistically relevant in the wild and the bar is higher regardless.
Now I happen to have a FIDO key which I use for my higher security contexts but I'm a fairly low value target and npm isn't one of my high security contexts. TOTP improves my security stance generally and removing it from npmjs.org weakened my security stance there.
I'm confused. All an attacker has to do is phish you to get your password and TOTP.
TOTP would cover cases like a compromised password manager or a reused password. That's it, right?
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