Comment by Avamander
14 hours ago
> but somehow we don't go and ban kitchen knives, as having them around is valuable
Some countries do :) Though I think physical analogies are misleading in a lot of ways here.
> Systems can be secure and trusted by the user without having to cede control, and some risks are just not worth eliminating.
Secure, yes, trustworthy to a random developer looking at your device, no. They're entirely separate concepts.
> Most importantly - it's the user who needs to know whether their system has been tampered with, not apps.
Expecting users to know things does a lot of heavy lifting here.
I never mentioned users having to know things (what you quoted was about the user getting informed whether their system is compromised, which is the job of a secure boot chain). The user being in control means that the user can decide who to trust. The user may end up choosing Google, Apple, Microsoft etc. and it's fine as long as they have a choice. Most users won't even be bothered to choose and that's fine too, but with remote attestation, it's not the user who decides even if they want to. And we don't need random developers looking at our devices to consider them trustworthy, it's none of their business and it's a big mistake to let them.
> what you quoted was about the user getting informed whether their system is compromised, which is the job of a secure boot chain
User being informed means they have to know what a compromised system would entail. That alone is a huge and frankly impossible thing to expect from regular people.
> Most users won't even be bothered to choose and that's fine too, but with remote attestation, it's not the user who decides even if they want to.
> And we don't need random developers looking at our devices to consider them trustworthy, it's none of their business and it's a big mistake to let them.
Then you can't demand those developers trust your device.