Comment by BLKNSLVR

10 hours ago

Making your traffic cross jurisdictional boundaries also adds a level of difficulty for tracking usage.

Local law enforcement can tap a local ISP for their records, but it would take a scale more effort to then tap a non-local service provider for their records. Each additional level of difficulty adds a cost, and at some point those costs aren't worth the potential results.

(assuming that the VPN provider doesn't just roll over due to an email inquiry, or isn't a front for very cooperative law enforcement).

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BLKNSLVR

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adgjlsfhk1  10 hours ago

the counterpoint is that making your traffic cross out of the US gives the NSA (by their ass backwards reading) permission to spy on you

  • BLKNSLVR  9 hours ago

    Fair point, but I'm not sure if that was ever a boundary they wouldn't cross, but for 'a little while now' I'd say it doesn't matter.

    From outside the US I should be using a VPN end-point within the US, so that my browsing traffic doesn't hit the NSA - only my encrypted VPN traffic does.

    • kyboren  8 hours ago

      > my browsing traffic doesn't hit the NSA - only my encrypted VPN traffic does

      I mean, let's be real.

      All known US VPN servers and Tor exit nodes--and probably all US Tor relays regardless of exit policy--are going to be considered a totally legitimate "communications facility" target for the warrantless wiretapping system due to exactly the scenario you just posited.

      From that perspective you'd be better off using US residential proxies. Of course, while they'll never admit it in court, NSA just does whatever they want, laws be damned, and are almost certainly logging everything. So while such a scheme might theoretically hinder the introduction of evidence in a court case, it doesn't really matter; NSA is still gonna see your traffic and they're still gonna either drone strike you or "parallel construction" your ass, anyway.

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