Comment by wat10000

> By what definition?

We have this definition from the history of western languages, the history of western philosophy, and works by Lewis Mumford and Franz Reuleaux, among others authors.

> The relevant question is whether they're purely physical objects behaving according to rules, which is being described as "machine," or whether there is something beyond that. Current understanding is contradictory: all indications are that cells and bodies are purely physical objects, except that there is this phenomenon of subjective experience which doesn't fit with that at all.

Then you would say that you dog broke (died), or that the vet fixed your cat (cured). Which by all means we might speak that way, but surely you would notice that it is not accurate.

Saying that a living organism is just a machine because it is a physical object behaving according to rules is like saying that a beautifully built house is just a bunch of bricks layed in rows and something on top.

But assuming that we say 'purely physical objects behaving according to rules' are machines, then:

1) there is no difference between you, your dog, your fridge and the snail in you garden 2) It would be semantically valid in all languages to say 'my dog broke' instead of it died, 'i got fixed' instead of 'the doctor cured me' 3) Machines vary in complexity and we would still have 'degrees of complexity' regarding machines (human bodies being the most complex, perhaps, toasters being fairly simple), but fundamentally, all of them would follow the same rules for 'fixing', 'breaking' and 'repairing'. Which is not the case. 4) You would have to come up with some kind of theology regarding how we were built. There is no evidence that we have been 'built', quite the contrary.

And most probably there are quite more reasons not to regard machines as living organisms nor living organisms as machines.