Comment by doublerabbit
10 days ago
Taking that political scenario as an example. Was the decline caused simply because Harley kept to the same working formula refusing to innovate for competition? As to the likes of Honda and Co?
Manufacturing is cheaper if you have access to resources and such. Japan may of had abundant of but in this case I don't feel it's was all about manufacturing costs.
Was it a cash cow situation, where their one formula was working but as well as where Harley were reluctant to invest in a different avenue, to innovate causing cow to dry up. And that is when they called in the government to settle? That is always the impression I seem to receive.
Excluding manufacturing costs was it because they were scared of an innovation being a failure?
The same cash cow formula can be seen with the likes of Disney Pixar and Toy Story 5, a pointless movie plot at this point where if money was invested, a new creation could be born.
A current account deficit is a capital account surplus, assets and exports compete in the balance of payments, an asset windfall kills exports by increasing the currency hurdle and embedded asset price.
What you are seeing is "the bar" for a successful manufacturing business increasing until only the most profitable are left -- things like chips, things like shell companies that exist to monetize a brand. "New growth" isn't highly profitable so it never has a chance to get started (unless a recipient of an asset windfall is willing to finance it all the way to "the bar" -- see: Elon Musk).
Ah. I get it now. A established economic model is provable and that in five years you can forecast that if you follow X guide you'll end up on top with Y.
If competition is on the scene then how can you assure me that myself taking the risk of investing will return me the sum I wish for in return.
Production has already been established but the threat is in that an another forecastable model exists and that to catch up to their market will require more investment and expenditure which could lead in less chance of a return. And even if the model is copyable; as like the trope of Chinese knockoffs to of Japanese products, you're still at a lower advantage.
It's not they don't want to innovate but the risk to gamble on innovation is high enough that you could stifle competition cheaper via governmental means.
This slows their forecast and where you can then strategise to overcome the competition rather than risking expenditure via innovation. Crafty, cheers.
It's worth tracing this through every level in order to get the causality correct.
Triffin's Dilemma says that in the case of the modern USA, assets will be pumped. Macroeconomics says asset pump = export dump.
The way that economics dumps exports is by raising the bar (strong currency = poor customers, expensive assets = expensive houses = expensive labor, costs go up, price goes down, profitability is squeezed). Eventually the bar became impossible to hop without a cheat code like "good brand and no R+D" or "software level profitability".
At the individual level, manufacturing pay went in the shitter as the jobs dried up while house prices and stock prices went through the roof... so everyone who could became real estate agents, or doctors overcharging real estate agents, or sellers of investment scams to venture capitalists.
What's wild is that this happened to the Spanish, the Dutch, the English, and by the 1960s Triffin could see that it would happen to the US as well.
If you want details from an economist who does his homework, "Trade Wars are Class Wars" by Klein and Pettis.
> A current account deficit is a capital account surplus,
That's true.
> assets and exports compete in the balance of payments, an asset windfall kills exports by increasing the currency hurdle and embedded asset price.
They don't really have to compete with each other. It depends on what the central bank does (or doesn't do) about the exchange rate, for example.
Weakening the dollar would make the export sector happy, but if you did enough of it to make the US export sector strong you would make assets unhappy. In fact, we have front row seats to this very lesson which appears to be even stronger in reality than it is in theory: we are already seeing yields rise despite a dollar that is still strong enough to crush exports.
Assets have had such a stranglehold over US politics for the last 50 years that if we ever actually run pro-export policy it won't be due to doomed self-promotion by exports (we even have a term for the pattern where this fails on first contact with tradeoffs: TACO) it will be because assets self-sabotage, implode, and exports fill the vacuum.
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