Comment by mannykannot
13 hours ago
Then, presumably, you will also hold that when you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain.
Tendentiously redefining the word "simulation" in an attempt to avoid the awkward cases is not going to save an argument that was dead on arrival.
Are brains responsible for consciousness? Or are brains a tool that our consciousness uses to understand the world?
you might as well call consciousness a soul at this point.
something I once wondered about is what a soul can be and what implications it would have. the conclusions I drew is that the entire concept was incoherent. if a soul is so intrinsically linked to the brain (experience) such that it always goes along for the ride even into the abyss (eg. dementia) then it by itself wouldn't have any value even if it existed.
They seem to be. But that argument doesn't matter much because you can simulate the whole body. (If you want to argue consciousness is outside the body, I could get into the physics argument but instead I'll just claim that consciousness will attach to the computer too and if you have a reason it wouldn't it's your burden to say why.)
I don’t know where consciousness is but I think if we accept that you can simulate a brain exactly that doesn’t prove consciousness of a model as consciousness is a metaphysical concept really
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I will indeed hold that, and it was my point to go to against post you were replying to and bolster your position. They try to make a point about modeling but they back it up by talking about virtually modeling real, physical processes. If I model a hurricane with a computer nothing gets wet. If I model a hurricane with giant fans and sprinklers then things do get wet and, if I'm able to achieve a certain level of fidelity with my giant fans and sprinklers then whether or not i've made a hurricane is a rather arbitrary distinction as your living room is several blocks from where it was yesterday regardless of whether it was put there by a real hurricane or a mere model.
Ah, thanks - I thought you were trying to save the "a simulation is never the real thing" by substituting a different word when it is clear that the simulation is doing what the real thing does. This is a tactic I think of as "lexical hacking" and it is surprisingly common among philosophy-of-mind academics.
“digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does”
If in responding to its inputs it experiences consciousness (=lights are on, experiences senses, perceives qualia), then you’ve built a brain. If your model simulates all the processing of a but does not have these then you have what’s fairly called a simulation of a brain. You can assert there is no such thing but good luck getting me to believe you.
> You can assert there is no such thing...
No such thing as what? As far as I can tell, I have asserted no such thing as there being no such thing, whatever it is.
“you will also hold that when you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain.”
What is this then?
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If someone digitally modelled a nuclear reactor, would any energy be produced?
No, because the simulation is actually missing an important aspect, namely the causal part that exists with the physical material but not in the simulation. It’s actually that it’s missing these components that makes it a simulation and not the real thing. But for that you need the physical material.
So why would it be different for the brain? If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else?
A digital simulation of an Enigma machine is not just abstract relationships. Its program is, but the program is not the simulation; the simulation is the program running on suitable hardware, which provides the causal element. Note that the hardware on which the program runs is very different from an Enigma machine's hardware, and the latter would be unable to run the simulation program. This is what is meant by substrate independence, a concept poorly understood by many philosophers-of-mind.
There are many differences between Enigma-machine simulation and nuclear-reactor simulation, but the one that is relevant here is that the former's inputs and outputs are abstract information, and we have very good reason to think that a brain's biological purpose (in the sense of what the organism needs it to do) is, like the Enigma machine's, abstract information processing in the broad sense.
We obviously will never agree since functionalism and my form of somewhat-physicalism are at complete odds. But I do want to understand your position more.
You say that the physical hardware your enigma simulation runs on provides the causal element. But the simulation of the nuclear reactor also runs on physical hardware. Yet it obviously doesn't provide the causal element, and neither does the enigma machine simulation's hardware. There are no spinning gears for example. Hence why you and I both call it a simulation, I think we're in agreement here.
I think you could argue that while the actual simulation of the enigma machine is not an actual enigma machine, the essence of the enigma machine is not grounded in physical reality, it's the abstract relationships we're talking about. And I could also agree. The essence of the enigma machine are it's abstract inputs and outputs.
But now about the brain. You said
> When you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain
The issue is that you have not built a brain, you have built a simulation of the abstract relationships of how a brain works. The brain is obviously more than that, considering it exists in physical reality. And thus the claim is that the essence of the brain is the abstract relationships, correct?
The problem I see is that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. In fact it seems like it's the magnum opus of phenomenon, in that all our experience comes from our consciousness. And you have to then bridge the gap between the simulation and physical reality. At most you can say you "simulated" consciousness, but questions about qualia remain.
Anyways I'm not trying to attack you or your views, I'd love to hear where I go wrong in your mind on this.
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>So why would it be different for the brain? If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else?
Because consciousness isn't something the brain produces like a hormone or an excited particle. Consciousness isn't an output of the brain that is somehow separate from it, it is the manner in which the brain processes sensory information and makes decisions to produce output.
The causal context in which brain dynamics occurs is orthogonal to the relevant properties regarding consciousness. Consciousness is a state characterized by certain kinds of information processing, namely that which carries relevant semantics of the organism encoded in a way that maximizes effective control by the executive center. Consciousness is the rich semantic space in which the executive center engages to affect highly competent control of the organism. It is substrate independent information processing.
You have this backwards. Thoughts and decisions precede consciousness, the sense of authorship is mostly constructed after the fact. See studies on readiness potentials in motor cortex.
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This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The question is if a sufficiently abstract description of that processing captures everything physically constitutive of consciousness. How would you support your position that it does?
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And then the argument about Consciousness becomes whether it is strictly and completely necessary for the input to Output process.
There's also the question of input output range.
I'm not arguing one way or another on such issues; Here, I am just pointing out how irrelevant the "a simulated rainstorm does not get you wet" argument is, when presented as blocking the possibility of a brain simulation having a mind.
what is wrong with saying if if you model a hurricane it wets your pants then you have a hurrican but right now ur pants dry yeah