Comment by imglorp

15 hours ago

tldw, per Blancolirio: unstable approach, crew should have done a go around at 1000 agl but did not attempt one until it was too late, then aborted the go around.

I think the real question is why didn't the pilots do a go around. I bet there are underlying pressures from the airlines and/or amazon to not do a go around to avoid schedule delays or fuel costs.

  • I've never heard of anything even close to this.

    Airlines in the US do not pressure pilots to avoid go arounds. Pilots in the US do not delegate life or death decisions to ops, especially since the FAA legally holds them accountable for that. All pilots are aware that they are responsible for the decision to go around or not.

    Any airline found to be pressuring pilots to avoid go arounds would be in a world of pain with the FAA.

    On cargo flights in particular timing and fuel usage are less critical than passenger flights, and a go around doesn't affect either much.

    Pressure to avoid go arounds would also be incredibly counter productive since go arounds exist to preserve life and property. Pilots do go arounds to avoid costly incidents.

    You are correct that the question is why they didn't do a go around, but I would bet a large sum of money that airline pressure to avoid go arounds was not a factor.

    • https://www.cbsnews.com/news/miami-plane-crash-21-air-safety...

      > The Amazon Prime Air Boeing 767 cargo plane that crashed off a Miami runway on Sunday, killing five people, was operated by a North Carolina company that has been accused by past employees of violating safety regulations, legal documents reveal.

      There's a lot in the article, but this allegation is worth highlighting:

      > Seuring's attorney, Michael Anello, told the judge that another 21 Air pilot, Johnny Salmonson, "was being pressured to fly in periods of time that were too short to comply with the proper amounts of rest, and that implicated safety. The layovers were too short."

      8 replies →

    • Get-there-itis is absolutely a thing. No big airline would be dumb enough to say it that stuff explicitly but the pressures still exist.

      There have been accidents around the world where pilots were trying to save fuel, get off work at a normal time instead of 2 hours extra holding, not wanting to divert and not be home, try to get on the ground so they don’t go over their max hours for the day, etc.

      Yes it’s counterproductive. *It happens*. External or internal, it happens.

      3 replies →

    • There have already been crashes where one contributing factor was pressure to land and avoid any kind of delay - even if risky. Remember that pressure doesn’t need to be explicit. It can be the result of all kinds of factors - including physical. Maybe they were already late and pilots with fewer “on time” arrivals are lower in line for promotions. We already have stories from Amazon delivery drivers and it’s not insane to think some of that culture has leaked through to other aspects.

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    • Southwest airlines had a culture of turning around fast at the gate. So maybe no explicit policy but culture can drive unintended consequences and decisions.

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    • >Airlines in the US do not pressure pilots to avoid go arounds. Pilots in the US do not delegate life or death decisions to ops,

      Construction companies in the US do not pressure employees to get shit done. Construction workers do not delegate the decisions to work in sketchy circumstances, especially since OSHA holds them accountable for all that.

      See how silly that sounds?

      They cook up the rules to be all compliant and whatnot and then everyone breaks them a little pretty often and in tasteful ways in order to actually get the job done. If you get caught or screw up, it's on you.

      I assume this sort of pressure happens a lot less with pilots because of the cost of screw ups but there's still probably some implied pressure there.

      9 replies →

  • This is based on my understanding from several pilots who have weighted in.

    The cockpit voice recorder transcript has the copilot repeatedly saying "we're coming in too fast" but the pilot never clearly acknolwedges.

    The copilot ought to have been more assertive and said "We need to go around. NOW."

    The pilot shouldn't have needed that. He should have made the call himself, but even if he was unsure, once his copilot called that he should have done the right thing.

    Neither of them will ever fly again. The only question now is if either of them will go to prison. There's already a civil wrongful death lawsuit against them.

    • > Neither of them will ever fly again

      Why do you say this so confidently? Aviation generally does not have a culture of taking future employment away from people proximate to accidents.

      Seems likely the FO will be fine. The CA will have some hard questions to answer.

  • Normalization of deviance. While there may have been some pressure from corporate or whatever, my guess is that the pilot flying was the one who only got his type rating a few months ago and that he'd done this at least a few times before in another type and gotten away with it. Now in a bigger, less nimble craft, he didn't.

  • In one of the videos you can see dark clouds behind the plane. I suspect the pilots knew they'd have to divert to a different airport if they couldn't land and put pressure on themselves to not have to do that.

    • You can go around and try again at the same airport long before you have to divert.

  • I suspect the pilots knew it wasn't a great approach but it just didn't click how bad it was. They just felt committed to the approach and thought they could 'fix it' without realizing how bad things really were. Having good enough situational awareness that you wave off when you are supposed to generally means that you also aren't wildly off speed/other parameters. They clearly had lost situational awareness.

    The thing that amazes me about this is the timeline here:

    00:30 The nose and right main gear touched down at a groundspeed of 158 knots.

    ...

    00:19 The left main gear touched down at a groundspeed of 134 knots.

    00:15 A pilot called for a go-around.

    11 seconds and 24 knots after the nose touched down and then the left main finally also touched down? Wow. Then 4 seconds after all that the go-around. It is one thing to hold the nose off for that long, but a main mount?!

    • How did they ignore the descent rate and speed? They were absolutely diving at the ground. It's just such an elementary mistake.

  • [flagged]

    • The branding on the plane is Prime Air, but it's not actually Amazon owned and run. Instead it's a cargo airline (21 Air) that they contract with to operate cargo flights with Prime Air livery on the planes.

      It'll be interesting to see the outcome of the NTSB investigation, they're usually quite thorough.

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  • Could a company that won't let delivery drivers stop to pee possibly be pushing their pilots that hard? Yes. Yes, they could.

Yep, its also the most intuitive way to reason about it when you look at the data. Unfortunately, a bad call. I'm sure many of us would have made the same mistake.

  • > I'm sure many of us would have made the same mistake.

    From the reporting and commenting on this incident, that is not the impression I'm getting. This wasn't one bad call after getting half way down the runway, this was a continuous stream of bad decision making for the entire approach, with the copilot suggesting the pilot go around too.

    Also: this kind of incident is very rare, so obviously, the vast majority of pilots don't make this mistake.

  • Private pilot here. No, I'm quite sure very few of you here would have made the same mistake as evidenced by the fact that literally hundreds of thousands of aircraft land successfully every day, many of them under much more adverse conditions. This is not a oh-it-could-have-happened-to-anyone kind of screwup, this is a did-this-guy-really-go-through-basic-pilot-training kind of screwup.

    • I’m not a manned pilot, but have my part 107 and have spent a few thousand hours flying combat flight sims - ~150kts in a cargo aircraft, four seconds from departing the runway, seems like the worst possible time to abort a touch-and-go. Then consider the numerous automated audio warnings and the copilot suggesting a go-around, and it seems pretty ridiculous to me.

      Don’t get me wrong - if I had to land that plane, I’d likely have overrun the runway too. I’m not saying it’s easy, only that it appears to me that they were operating well outside the documented parameters that are the pilot’s responsibility to know.

      I just looked it up, and a 767’s Vref is 122-165kts, with Vref at max weight at 144kts. They touched down at 158kts, nose down. The approach was ~35kts over speed, they were above the glide slope, and not bleeding speed fast enough to sink - so they dropped the nose.

      From what I can see, they were screwed the moment they touched down - the last moment they had a reasonable opportunity to abort was when they decided to drop the nose and commit instead.

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    • I have a strong hunch there a deeper more human/emotional component involved. Like Pilot A was not in the right mental headspace. A bad breakup? Some other kind of personal loss? Or an urgency of a personal kind?

      Those are a few situations when a trained individual could make a series of bad decisions. More so if they were forced into the situation (flying) despite raising objections. It has happened to other 21 Air pilots in the past - when they objected to flying but were forced, so who knows?

      Absolutely does not absolve this individual of the incident. It’s a burden they’ll have to bear for the rest of their lives. But it could help explain why?