Comment by wood_spirit
3 hours ago
> they will do almost anything if they are convinced it is justified
I’m in the “glorified spell checker” camp, although I don’t mean to reduce their impressive utility and belittle them in the way many people read that term and infer.
So I am not sure that an llm “justifies” anything. I mean that their “thinking” text talks about justifications but it is just a very advanced statistical regurgitation of the kind of text humans use. I don’t think it means the model has internalised the meaning of it (as witness when you talk to an llm how often it forgets what you recently told it was important etc).
What you really have is a model that tries the statistically most probable thing to say next and so on and what is really cool is how effective this is at generating a path that we can slap a narrative over afterwards that makes the whole thing feel motivated and consistent, like the model started off knowing how it was going to get to the destination.
Which is, under the hood, a completely different kind of “intelligence” as the supercomputer in War Games.
Ultimately, the brain is just a bunch of neurons activating in a specific pattern. This observation does not really tell us anything though. It doesn't acknowledge the difference between a 2500 Neuron fruit fly brains and a human brain.
Likewise, the fact that LLMs are a stochastic autoregressive process (which is a class of systems every bit as rich as the ODEs used to model neurons) tells us nothing a priori.
Absolutely. If someone makes the weights do continuous learning etc then perhaps an llm can internalise morals. Of course, just like a human, it will be possible to talk it out of those morals. Another recent thread about this is https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49744420
If I repeatedly call an LLM in a loop with a markdown document it can edit, would that make it qualify for you?
If I give an LLM to compact its context window, so the context it carries can evolve iteratively over time as more and more things come in, is that enough?
Compacting the context is really a very, very interesting example here. The "next token predictor" is telling an external tool to change all "previous" tokens. So an LLM + a harness that allows compacting the context is no longer just a token predictor at all!
You don't need continuous learning to get interesting dynamics. You just need feedback loops.
One is an observation the other is not, it's a description of what it is; one is a posteriori, the other is a priori (contrary to what you say).
They're not comparable.
I used to share that perspective until very recently, but today I think it's an outdated way to think of the cutting-edge LLMs. There is so much more going on, with MOEs, internal loops, guardrails and tools that I suspect we're dealing with something that's a little more than the sum of its parts. Not intelligent in the way we recognize in biological organisms, but certainly something beyond a mere Markov chain.
Make no mistakes.
LLMs are language model, and nowhere in their code you can find actual reasoning. Re-reinforcement is not magical process that builds conscience or emotions.
We are talking about probability built on statistics, with extea steps.
Stop humanizing LLMs.
Agents are not simple language models.
You can't find actual reasoning in a brain either. (Note that you can't tell the difference between a conscious brain and a comatose brain by examining them.) This is the same as Leibniz's mill argument ... it's a fallacy of composition.
> Re-reinforcement is not magical process that builds conscience or emotions.
They aren't the result of magic at all, but we are nowhere near the point of identifying what processes do or don't produce consciousness (or a conscience) or can be characterized as having emotions.
> Stop humanizing LLMs.
That's a clearly dishonest mischaracterization of the GP.
I've read some of your other comments about LLMs and I find them unreasonably reductionistic, whereas I think the word "just" should be banned from ontological discussion, so I don't think further engagement would be beneficial and I won't be engaging in it. (And I'm actually quite conservative in ascribing cognitive traits to LLMs or other "AI".)
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> I don’t think it means the model has internalised the meaning of it (as witness when you talk to an llm how often it forgets what you recently told it was important etc).
Humans forget stuff all the time anyway. Would you give them the same diagnosis?
Btw, what you describe about 'the most probably next token' would be true for a model that only went through pre-training where they only train on exactly that task.
But there's a lot of re-inforcement learning afterwards.
> But there's a lot of re-inforcement learning afterwards.
That just shifts the distribution of tokens produced. Ultimately they are still just next token predictors.
Like, even "reasoning" models basically work by generating more tokens at inference time, and using them to shift the distribution towards more useful outcomes (in some cases).
They are next token producers. I would only call it a predictor, if it's trained to predict tokens (ie just after pretraining).
Just like humans produce one word after another when they talk, but they don't generally try to imitate other humans.
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