Comment by betteryet
4 hours ago
How did the board plan pull this off if Mullenweg has 84% of the voting shares? For that matter, what is even the purpose of a board in a multi-class share structure with the founder holding above 50% voting shares.
4 hours ago
How did the board plan pull this off if Mullenweg has 84% of the voting shares? For that matter, what is even the purpose of a board in a multi-class share structure with the founder holding above 50% voting shares.
> For that matter, what is even the purpose of a board in a multi-class share structure with the founder holding above 50% voting shares.
I guess it was mostly advisory, with the added purpose of making it seem like the various organisations were stewarded by members of the community that were not Matt Mullenweg.
> what is even the purpose of a board in a
Delaware law requires a board.
Whether limited liability should actually be allowed at all in such a situation is a better question.
Fig leaf and a way to offload some responsibility. I would never ever join a board like that, you're in the hot seat when it goes wrong and yet you have no agency.
Speculation: performative, seeking to illustrate Mullenweg's gross unsuitability for the organization.
How does the word "performative" apply to an exercise of the board's one major function? Wouldn't that be the definition of substantive?
The fact that they were subsequently fired doesn't make it into a performance. It's still a board resolution.
With 84% of voting shares by the CEO, the board was setup to fail.
3 replies →
They expected this to fail, they gave themselves golden parachutes: https://techcrunch.com/2026/09/16/automattics-interim-ceo-an...
Don't confuse the board members with other members of their C-suite.
You're right, it doesn't seem like the board was involved in the golden parachute. Hard to imagine they tried this out of the goods of their hearts but I cannot find anything concrete to say otherwise
Just looking at shares is over simplistic.
You can't know what other conditions Mullenweg signed in contracts such as shareholders agreements etc.
Typically if you take VC money, the VCs will require the ability to sack the founder and take control, perhaps if particular targets are not met.
I've seen it: an ambitious owner agreed to stretch goals, and the VCs took took over the company from the founder after they had predictably failed to meet the goals.
Back to reality. Read TFA again.
robocat was answering a general question about the relationship between ownership and control. And they're right that representing 84% of the voting shares doesn't mean anything. It's standard for major investors to have their board seats guaranteed, plus veto rights over things like creating new stock and selling the company. (It's not standard to have "the ability to sack the founder and take control", though.)
Founders are almost always outnumbered on the board by Series B, but like I speculated in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49638676, Automattic is unusual here, and Mullenweg may control it. There's still a decent chance that True Ventures left in protest rather than being booted, though, and has the right to a seat[1]. It's just, what's the point if Mullenweg has them beat 4-1?
1. Edit: The article confirms that Toni Schneider resigned, but not whether True Ventures (his firm) has the right to a seat.