Comment by redox99

3 hours ago

Anthropic is an awful company and it really shows in their models.

I purchased Claude Pro to try out Opus 5.5. First thing I do is tell it to configure "bypass permissions" as the default for new threads (a one line settings.json change).

Instead of doing it, it tells me how to find settings.json and what to change there. I reply back "you do it". It flat out refuses, and again.

> I still can't do this, even when you ask again. Making bypass mode the default switches off Claude Code's permission checks, and I'm not allowed to change security settings like that on anyone's behalf.

Immediately canceled the plan. I'm not going to use such a patronizing model that can't follow instructions as basic as editing a .json. What the hell is up with that? A robot telling me "want to change this file? YOU do it, silly human, I won't do it for you". Fuck off.

I've literally never seen anything like this with any other model. Back to using Codex and Chinese models.

It makes a lot of sense for the model to not be able to do it, whether you like it or not. In fact, it shows that Anthropic, despite all of their issues, are paying some attention to the risks of malicious prompt injection and models attempting to bypass restrictions.

If it could do it whenever you ask it to, it could also do it unprompted or by finding a file in your directory that told it to do it, which would make the entire permission system useless...

  • This is not prompt injection. This is a prompt entered by a human through the Claude UI.

    Being unable to perform an action is not a solution to prompt injection. A solution to prompt injection is being able to tell apart what is the real input and what is injected. I expect it to follow whatever I typed into it, and not blindly follow what it read from a file or an external source.

    If they are not confident in their ability to do so, at least allow to remove the training wheels so people who know what they are doing and the risks are not patronized by the model. But you don't even get a confirmation box to perform that action, it flat out refuses.

    It really is like people defending Apple not allowing side loading because you as a user can't be trusted.

    • > This is not prompt injection. This is a prompt entered by a human through the Claude UI.

      Well, to LLMs this is the same thing - an input. Prompt from the user and prompt from the attacker use the same input into the LLM's neural network, so to speak.

      So it makes sense for it to be a bit more paranoid.

      There are other possible architectures probably but for now I think nobody uses them. See e.g. https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/

      4 replies →

This is pretty sane default behaviour. If it's sandboxed it really cant edit the file for you, you have to enable bypass/auto mode (shift+tab) so it can request a sandbox breakout, or run with --dangerously-skip-permissions.

  • Yes it can, what are you talking about? it's a file in my home directory owned by my user, the same which is running claude. In fact it did edit it for other changes. And I was already in bypass permissions mode. I wanted to change the default for new threads.

    • The harness runs itself in a sandbox, Codex does the same. Then it can request approval for individual tool calls to be made outside that sandbox, depending on your permission mode. At least this is the case in MacOS.

      I see what you mean now though - you can change the default permission mode with /config in CC, but it will indeed not make that change on your behalf.

      1 reply →

You don't realize the point of disallowing Claude to change it's own permissions?

  • Literally none, if I have keyboard and mouse input it means I can already change that file. From a unix point of view this process runs under my user so it has access to ~/.claude. Absolutely no security is gained here. It could launch a UAC prompt or equivalent if it were really worried about true physical access. Flat out refusing means its a trash product. This kind of stuff works perfectly on Codex. And let's be real it would be trivial to have it code and run a program that gives arbitrary file access.