Comment by pinevale

5 hours ago

I've seen many posts like this. None of them stood the test of time. Ease is irrelevant because you only need expertise once and then everyone can reuse the result.

It's also not easy to pop an iPhone, but reliable, weaponized exploits are available in trade and governments use them in a plug-and-play way.

The specific controversy here is about the disclosure timeline. Some people allege that the disclosure and patch release of this vulnerability were mishandled; others dispute this. The dispute turns crucially on how available exploits were during the embargo period. Nobody is arguing that the vulnerability doesn't need to be patched at all. (The PHP core team didn't initially treat it with much urgency, but they've acknowledged that this was a mistake.)

Time is the whole point though. Everyone was terrified and shutting their websites down because they believed the exploit would be running wild on the internet in between it hitting git and them being able to update the server.

If it takes a week to come up with a working exploit code, the critical services have time to update.

  • Time is part of the point, but it is not the whole point. The whole point involves the fact that this impacts two decades worth of PHP versions. Even if it took months to exploit, there is going to be a long, long tail of breaches against ill-maintained legacy sites.

  • But just because there isn't a working PoC on GitHub doesn't mean there isn't one and things aren't been actively exploited.

    If you are a bad actor you probably don't share your PoC around as it means less boxes to hit.

    • You can never rule out the possibility that someone interested in attacking you has a non-public exploit, but it's dramatically less likely if there aren't already working exploits circulating all over the internet.

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  • With AI i think it's safe to assume it would only take hours after you give it what/where to look

  • That "if" is load bearing and increasingly flat-out false.

    Crowdstrike's average "breakout times", the time gap between a first successful infiltration and maximal exploitation, has gone from days or hours prior to 2024 to minutes or seconds now.

ease is somewhat relevant initially, since it determines how quickly you have to patch before exploits start popping up. I would be extremely curious to see if anyone has been pwned by this already, especially before the public release of the patches (not that I doubt it, but I heard some people saying they saw attempts in their logs, but not really enough information to tell whether they were understanding their logs correctly. The situation just seems a bit murky and unclear to me).

I guess the main takeaway is: we (humans? current methodology?) are bad at estimating how urgent a fix is or needs to be.