Comment by hyperpape

7 hours ago

There's also a tweet by Matthew Prince that says Cloudflare saw thousands of attempts pre-announcement, https://x.com/eastdakota/status/2113079352682570051, then tens of thousands post announcement, and now millions.

Unfortunately, if you read the announcement as referring to 14:00 UTC, that's several hours after Chainguard published their images. I don't know if it's plausible that people saw the Chainguard builds, understood the issue from those and built exploits, but a precise timeline would help understand better.

The Cloudflare one refers to the time period after the leak where people had already made PoCs. Amazon’s detection is days earlier which is quite concerning.

  • So either there was another (but non-public) leak or someone else discovered the exploit almost at the same time as it was about to be published. I guess the latter is much less likely because it would be a major coincidence.

    • The attacker may have known about the exploit for a long time and were saving it, but upon finding out that it was about to be disclosed, they decided it was now or never.

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    • With everybody using LLMs there are no coincidences. Popular LLM platforms are like Oracles that help you identify what other people have been working on. "Find a bug in PHP" might have been useless s few months ago, but once somebody used it to develop a full exploit the LLM will start to regurgitate that information.

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Yeah — I have log entries I believe show LLM-bot-driven exploit attempts — POSTs to a variety of non-application URLs, blocked on the front end proxy by rules I added that prevent multipart form POSTs -- from an hour before the patch was released.

And an odd little cluster of potential attempts it caught just after 9am GMT. Again I can't see any reason why I would be getting multipart form posts to those URLs, it's definitely an exploit, but it's possible there's another older exploit with that pattern. They aren't WP-type URLs though.