Comment by rudolftheone

16 hours ago

That's something which caught my attention:

> First, we aim not to release open weights that would extend the absolute frontier of cyber capability. K3.1 Pro's offensive cyber capability is, by design, below what our pipeline can produce, and remains behind that of frontier proprietary models. Second, we intend to progressively raise the cyber capability available in open weights.

So they admit that they could do more, but they won't?

> So they admit that they could do more, but they won't?

Yeah, there's another paragraph:

> Identifying and removing cyber-related data. During development, we observed vulnerability research performance improving steadily as post-training scaled. Tracing the source of this trend, we found that cyber-related content was embedded within the general mid-training corpus, and cyber-related tasks were present in the RL environment mix — a natural byproduct of training on broad data. In preliminary experiments on internal models, we found that without data removal at either the mid-training or the RL stage, downstream cyber capability would increase substantially. These findings gave us a concrete lever for control. For the open-weight release of K3.1 Pro, we identified and removed cyber-related data from both training stages, while retaining the general-purpose coding tasks needed for model usefulness. We will continue to apply appropriate controls at every training stage, of which cyber-related data identification and restriction is one example.

(emphasis mine)

It's clear that cyber is a touchy subject right now. But it's also clear that RL works on it, because it's highly verifiable. So smaller models are going to become very interesting, because they can be fine-tuned later to cover this field.

  • I'm betting this is related to China's Announcement No. 48 last week about AI export controls, since releasing an open-weight model is effectively export: https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-proposes-new-export-...

    > Prohibited: high-performance detection technologies used to counter cross-border data transmission security risks, including deep-synthesis forgery detection (266401J); AI cyber offensive capability technologies, such as malicious code generation and mutation, automated mass generation and distributed large-scale deployment of anti-detection variants (266402J); large models trained using China’s Core Data (266501J); and high-performance AI agents designed for highly sensitive scenarios, such as critical information infrastructure, national defense and core government affairs (266502J).

  •   > It's clear that cyber is a touchy subject right now.
    

    And that's why we need models that understand "cyber" or application and data security. The offensive models are powerful, and they are in the hands of script kiddies now. The models writing our software and designing our cloud infrastructure had better understand these issues as well, just to avoid coding in vulnerabilities.

  • I think this is misguided. Considering how much code is AI written these days do we really want LLMs writing insecure code because we lobotomised them?

    • Anthropic: Touch too much security stuff and we ban you, and keep your money.

      Kimi: We took out the worst of it so have at it for free.

      Everyone else: Back to my ablated model on openrouter for 1/10th the price where I can brute force issues.

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  • It’s not much of a deterrent to a motivated organization.

    They are basically saying that models themselves are already capable. If you fine tune them with some cyber security tasks, that should make them potent. :-/

    • There is no deterrent to a motivated and well resources organization. Post training a model in general, let alone just for offensive cybersecurity, is well within the technical and financial capabilities of many cyber criminals. There's just no way out of that.

  • Classic “rules for thee and not for me.”

    Agreed that this could be reinjected later. Makes me think of neo in the matrix:

    “I know zero days.”

    “Show me.”

    • Governments also control who owns tanks and missiles.

      Do you think that going around making cyber weapons isn't going to get you buried in a shallow grave?

With frontier competitors and the U.S. govt actively pushing "concerns" about Chinese models, Kimi including this statement on "offensive cyber capability" seems like smart defense. Models are opaque and training details are trade secrets, so whatever they did might be negligible or significant and no one can tell. This bit is also artfully done:

> "below what our pipeline can produce, and remains behind that of frontier proprietary models."

Like Ant and OAI, they've realized vaguely claiming to have nerfed their latest model to an unspecified degree not only looks 'good guy' prudent, it provides a built-in excuse when a model fails.

  • I'm not sure if not doing RL capability gain on offensive cybersecurity can be really called "nerfing"?

    They're not post training it to lose capabilities/censor them – they just don't spend training time on this topic, which sounds like a great idea.

    It doesn't mean model can't do it, it just means it's less good at it; -10% on benchmark feels like a great result and overall approach to pace it.

    • > I'm not sure if not doing RL capability gain on offensive cybersecurity can be really called "nerfing"?

      I concede that term can carry overly broad connotations.

Or it's a cop out. I could totally outrun Usain Bolt, but by design I don't push to set new World Records. I will increasingly show faster times though.

  • > Or it's a cop out. I could totally outrun Usain Bolt, but by design I don't push to set new World Records.

    The benchmarks show Kimi K3.1 Pro outrunning practically all models. It's weird to hear someone like you accusing them of making up excuses for not lagging behind in discussions on how they are ahead of the pack.

    • Not only is that not weird, it’s Occam’s Razor in action. “We could crush the competition but we are holding back” is a laughable excuse that I’m sure you wouldn’t buy in other contexts.

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  • Well, in the publication they claim to have identified specific cybersecurity post training tasks that nerfed capabilities when they removed them, which seems like a reasonable methodology.

    Seeing as no one besides blackhats want frontier cybercrime capability to be open source, this seems like a very sensible thing to do.

    So they have published a reasonable means, and they have a motive. I'd put my money on "probably true".

    • > Seeing as no one besides blackhats want frontier cybercrime capability to be open source

      Sure. The problem is that there is no practical difference between "cybercrime capability" and "cybercrime defense capability."

      All of my PRs go through an adversarial security review by GLM-5.3, because it's the only smart-enough model with a good understanding of cybersecurity issues that won't regularly refuse the job. Removing that ability from frontier models helps nobody except cyber criminals.

      3 replies →

    • The problem is, as anyone trying to address security concerns in claude can attest to, the guardrails trigger even when trying to address real bugs. Good cyber defense requires an understanding of the offense.

      How you avoid the "fix my code" attack, the code being someone else's code, I do not know. But nerfing the model doesn't seem like the best path forward either.

      2 replies →

    • I am a defender, and I really really want to have access to high quality models that are good at finding vulns and hacking. Leaving them in the hands only of government agencies and orgs with enough resources to do extensive training / fine tuning seems like the absolute worst possible case for the future security of global software systems.

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    • > Seeing as no one besides blackhats want frontier cybercrime capability to be open source

      I'm not interested in black hat anything, but I am very invested in making sure the products I work on are not compromised. Given that state agencies have "frontier cybercrime capability", I would like to have the same.

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    • It would also be very sensible to offer a BlackHat Pro version to national officials, for them.

    • Please don't change "cybersecurity" to "cybercrime" from one sentence to the next as a rhetorical flourish. It comes off as disingenuous and makes it harder to get your real point across.

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We really need some breakthrough like DiLoCo does, but for heterogeneous unstable consumer hardware to make volunteer crowdsourced AI training a reality. Yeah, I understand from current technical angle how much of a mountain that is. Call it AI@Home or whatever. I never thought it would bother me personally or even become a problem, but these companies acting like gatekeepers and virtue signaling while also in bed with governments etc.. this leads nowhere good.

Yeah that's a huge downside. That the model does the task without tripping over its own feet, like discovering a vulnerability the model itself accidentally built 15 minutes ago and triggering its own guardrails, made the Chinese models attractive to use for security-adjacent things. Also useful to red-team your own stuff. While I can understand the reasoning behind it (and I guess having a model that's really good at both offense and defense released into the ether could lead to CCP asking some very pointed questions if Moonshot managed to get blamed for some incident stemming from their model's misuse) it's still a huge disappointment.

I don't want to give US labs the results of my DNA tests and my family tree going back to the 16th century just to secure my shitty app, but if the Chinese are bowing out as well it seems the only alternative is to admit that some script kiddie with a bunch of tokens will just pwn you now and then.

  • If the Chinese want it, they have it. BGI does an enormous amount of sequencing. My own genome is entirely public (or was, and will be again when/if Personal Genome Project comes back) so you can watch and see if it harms me.

  • > I don't want to give US labs the results of my DNA tests

    My friend, you realize that if you have had blood drawn for a genetic test, there is a very decent probability that the sequencing was done by a Chinese lab operating in the US, right? The Chinese probably have more US genomes that the US does.

    https://pandorareport.org/the-gryphon-scientific-biosecurity...

    Also, illumina used to ship products with hardcoded S3 access, so purchasers of used equipment could gain access to sequencing information generated by the original owners. Too many links to cover all of it, here's the Gemini summary:

    https://share.google/aimode/4JLsHpeRCWlVqU8qT

This doesn't seem particularly notable and is in line with Anthropic and OpenAI's approach of restricting release/access to more capable models.

  • It is notable in that it’s the first time an open Chinese company openly stated they were reducing intelligence for “safety”.

    “Our lock can be picked by the robot.” We ban the robot instead of fixing the lock. It’s shortsighted.

    • If we had a technique that would defeat almost every lock in the world, we might be prudent to delay releasing that until people have had time to change the locks.

      Same general benefit as coordinated disclosure, except it's a big game-theory problem where we're likely to eventually have sufficiently capable defectors.

    • they're pretty clearly framing it as holding back on the robot and letting is lose slowly to give everyone time to update their locks

Read this as ‘dear government we can train a cyberweapon if you pay us’ assuming they wouldn’t say anything if they were already paid to do that

I hope one day they learn to inhabit their position more confidently instead of merely aping their competitors.

Moonshot (Kimi) seems to be unashamedly into American culture[0], I wonder if they're paying closer attention to and giving more credence to some cultural aspects of American AI discourse including aspects of AI caution/panic.

[0] https://x.com/crystalsssup/status/1944287779896328668

(note: extremely speculative and based on almost nothing, and especially near-complete ignorance to alternatives)

All it takes is one idiot who happens to have the resources to "pWm Teh Interwebs" to scare both the US and Chinese governments.

The more interesting question is how much more performance can be squeezed out by post training the open weights through RL.

Cowards.

The way to stop the vulnerability apocalypse is to fix the vulnerabilities, not to shoot the damn messengers.

I hope someone abliterates and FTs this model on vulnerability discovery so we can find more bugs in our testing, insecure tech stacks.

Good point. Wouldn't be good if there were white hat models being developed by legitimate organizations at this point?

I mean they say they will release the weights by November 4, so presumably after that it won’t be hard for people to fine-tune it to be better at cyber right?

  • My understanding is if something is entirely absent from the dataset, good luck trying to teach a model that through post training

    • Given that most of their improvements here are positioned as RL on their last base train, seems like just doing some additional RL would work fine?

    • Presumably if it knows how to find and fix bugs it can be told how to exploit them. But who knows what it will actually be capable of doing in the real world as opposed to Kiki’s benchmarks

It's not actively nerfed like the Western frontier models, it's just downweighting offensive "cyber" as a domain for post-training/fine tuning. Which, if anything, ought to improve model capabilities wrt. other domains.