Comment by skeptic_ai

15 days ago

Still go to prison for not showing. So until devices have multiple pins for plausible deniability we are still screwed.

What’s so hard to make 2-3 pins and each to access different logged in apps and files.

If Apple/android was serious about it would implement it, but from my research seems to be someone that it’s against it, as it’s too good.

I don’t want to remove my Banking apps when I go travel or in “dangerous” places. If you re kidnapped you will be forced to send out all your money.

Absolutely every aspect of it?

What’s so hard about adding a feature that effectively makes a single-user device multi-user? Which needs the ability to have plausible deniability for the existence of those other users? Which means that significant amounts of otherwise usable space needs to be inaccessibly set aside for those others users on every device—to retain plausible deniability—despite an insignificant fraction of customers using such a feature?

What could be hard about that?

  • > despite an insignificant fraction of customers using such a feature?

    Isn't that the exact same argument against Lockdown mode? The point isn't that the number of users is small it's that it can significantly help that small set of users, something that Apple clearly does care about.

    • Lockdown mode costs ~nothing for devices that don't have it enabled. GP is pointing out that the straightforward way to implement this feature would not have that same property.

    • Lockdown mode doesn’t require everyone else to lose large amounts of usable space on their own devices in order for you to have plausible deniability.

  • Android phones are multi-user, so if they can do it then Apple should be able to.

    • That is about one fiftieth of the work that needs to go into the feature the OP casually “why can’t they just”-ed.

    • This is called whataboutism. This particular feature aside, sometimes there are very good reasons not to throw the kitchen sink of features at users.

  • Maybe one PIN could cause the device to crash. Devices crash all the time. Maybe the storage is corrupted. It might have even been damaged when it was taken.

    This could even be a developer feature accidentally left enabled.

  • It doesn't seem fundamentally different from a PC having multiple logins that are accessed from different passwords. Hasn't this been a solved problem for decades?

    • Apple's hardware business model incentivizes only supporting one user per device.

      Android has supported multiple users per device for years now.

    • You can have a multiuser system but that doesn't solve this particular issue. If they log in to what you claim to be your primary account and see browser history that shows you went to msn.com 3 months ago, they aren't going to believe it's the primary account.

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  • Android has work profiles, so that could be done in Android. iPhone still does not.

    • Android has work profiles

      Never ever use your personal phone for work things, and vice versa. It's bad for you and bad for the company you work for in dozens of ways.

      Even when I owned my own company, I had separate phones. There's just too much legal liability and chances for things to go wrong when you do that. I'm surprised any company with more than five employees would even allow it.

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  • iPhone and macOS are basically the same product technically. The reason iPhone is a single user product is UX decisions and business/product philosophy, not technical reasons.

    While plausible deniability may be hard to develop, it’s not some particularly arcane thing. The primary reasons against it are the political balancing act Apple has to balance (remember San Bernardino and the trouble the US government tried to create for Apple?). Secondary reasons are cost to develop vs addressable market, but they did introduce Lockdown mode so it’s not unprecedented to improve the security for those particularly sensitive to such issues.

    • > iPhone and macOS are basically the same product technically

      This seems hard to justify. They share a lot of code yes, but many many things are different (meaningfully so, from the perspective of both app developers and users)

  • You think iPhones aren’t multi-user for technical reasons? You sure it’s not to sell more phones and iPads? Should we ask Tim “buy your mom an iPhone” Cook?

> Still go to prison for not showing. So until devices have multiple pins for plausible deniability we are still screwed.

> What’s so hard to make 2-3 pins and each to access different logged in apps and files.

Besides the technical challenges, I think there's a pretty killer human challenge: it's going to be really hard for the user to create an alternate account that looks real to someone who's paying attention. Sure, you can probably fool some bored agent in customs line who knows nothing about you, but not a trained investigator who's focused on you and knows a lot about you.

  • But at that point it turns from "the person refused to unlock the device" to "we think the person has unlocked the device into a fake account".

  • Doesn’t matter if the agent believes you. Only matters if the court jails you on a contempt charge.

  • Background agent in the decoy identity that periodically browses the web, retrieves email from a banal account etc.?

    • Even more complications for a “why can’t they just…”. It’s almost as if this kind of thing is difficult to do in practice.

    • > Background agent in the decoy identity that periodically browses the web, retrieves email from a banal account etc.?

      No. Think about it for a second: you're a journalist being investigated to find your sources, and your phone says you mainly check sports scores and send innocuous emails to "grandma" in LLM-speak? It's not going to fool someone who's actually thinking.

It's more a policy problem than a phone problem. Apple could add as many pins as they want but until there are proper legal based privacy protections, law enforcement will still just be like "well how do we know you don't have a secret pin that unlocks 40TB of illegal content? Better disappear you just to be sure"

For as long as law enforcement treats protection of privacy as implicit guilt, the best a phone can really do is lock down and hope for the best.

Even if there was a phone that existed that perfectly protected your privacy and was impossible to crack or was easy to spoof content on, law enforcement would just move the goal post of guilt so that owning the phone itself is incriminating.

Edit: I wanna be clear that I'm not saying any phone based privacy protections are a waste of time. They're important. I'm saying that there is no perfect solution with the existing policy being enforced, which is "guilty until proven dead"

How does "go to prison for not showing" work when a lot of constitutions have a clause for a suspect not needing to participate in their own conviction / right to remain silent?

A detective can have a warrant to search someone's home or car, but that doesn't mean the owner needs to give them the key as far as I know.

  • It does mean that. You can't be forced to divulge information in your head, as that would be testimonial. But if there are papers, records, or other evidentiary materials that are e.g. locked in a safe you can be compelled to open it with a warrant, and refusal would be contempt.

    • I know it seems like an incredibly dubious claim but the "I forgot" defense actually works here.

      It's not really that useful for a safe since they aren't _that_ difficult to open and, if you haven't committed a crime, it's probably better to open your safe for them than have them destroy it so you need a new one. For a mathematically impossible to break cipher though, very useful.

Assuming the rule of law is still functioning, there are multiple protections for journalists who refuse to divulge passwords in the USA. A journalist can challenge any such order in court and usually won't be detained during the process as long as they show up in court when required and haven't tried to destroy evidence.

Deceiving investigators by using an alternate password, or destroying evidence by using a duress code on the other hand is almost always a felony. It's a very bad idea for a journalist to do that, as long as the rule of law is intact.

  • I think it's pretty clear at this point that rule of law isn't functioning. Perhaps it never was. It was just rule of law theater.

Fourth and Fifth amendments disagree

  • Sure but in the real world it can take months or years, Francis Rawls stayed 4 years in jail because he didn't want to unlock hard drives.

  • People are jailed for contempt of court for failing to provide passwords.

    https://reason.com/2017/05/31/florida-man-jailed-180-days-fo...

    • Wow, so US judges are just making it up as they go along, huh? It's like every case is a different judgement with no consistent criterion.

      >Doe vs. U.S. That case centered around whether the feds could force a suspect to sign consent forms permitting foreign banks to produce any account records that he may have. In Doe, the justices ruled that the government did have that power, since the forms did not require the defendant to confirm or deny the presence of the records.

      Well, what if the defendant was innocent of that charge but guilty of or involved in an unrelated matter for which there was evidence in the account records?

There is no plausible deniability here, that's only relevant in a rule-of-law type of situation, but then you wouldn't need it as you can't be legally compelled to do that anyway. "We don't see any secret source communication on your work device = you entered the wrong pin = go think about what your behavior in jail"

Even if this worked (which would be massively expensive to implement) the misconfiguration possibilities are endless. It wouldn't be customer-centric to actually release this capability.

Better for the foreseeable future to have separate devices and separate accounts (i.e. not in the same iCloud family for instance)

Completely separate decision with a higher legal bar for doing that.

It's one thing to allow police to search a phone. Another to compel someone to unlock the device.

We live in a world of grays and nuance and an "all or nothing" outlook on security discourages people from taking meaningful steps to protect themselves.

“Plausible deniability” is a public relations concept. It doesn’t confer any actual legal protection.

  • It absolutely offers some legal protection. If it is implemented correctly, no legal framework for it is required. Government forces you to enter your password. You comply and enter "a" password. The device shows contents. You did what you were asked to do. If there is no way for the government to prove that you entered a decoy password that shows decoy contents, you are in the clear. Done correctly (in device and OPSEC) government can't prove you entered your decoy password so you can't be held in contempt. And that is the entire point. It is not like asking the government to give your "plausible deniability" rights. It is about not potentially incriminating yourself against people that abuse the system to force you to incriminate yourself.

    • > You comply and enter "a" password. The device shows contents. You did what you were asked to do.

      No, you did something fake to avoid doing what you were asked to do.

      > If there is no way for the government to prove that you entered a decoy password that shows decoy contents, you are in the clear.

      But there are very effective ways to find hidden encrypted volumes on devices. And then you’ll be asked to decrypt those too, and then what?

      This sort of thing is already table stakes for CSAM prosecutions, for example. Law enforcement can read the same blog posts and know as much about technology as you do. Especially if we are hypothesizing an advertised feature of a commercial OS!

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Yep, you need an emergency mode that completely resets the phone to factory settings, maybe triggered with a decoy pin. Or a mode that physically destroys the chip storing the keys

I always wondered if this was the feature of TrueCrypt that made it such a big target. LUKS is fine, I guess, but TrueCrypt felt like actual secrecy.

You do not. We have this thing in our constitution called the 5th amendment. You cannot be forced to divulge the contents of your mind, including your pin or passwords. Case law supports this. For US citizens at least. Hopefully the constitution is still worth something.

  • That's in the fantasy world of constitution maximalists. In real world it doesn't work like that and you might still lose money/time/your sanity fighting a system who cares less and less about your rights

    • The case law on this specific topic is convincing. If you are ever in that situation it is usually going to be worth your time and money to assert the right and see it through. Case law supports this. The general maximum “penalty” is being held in contempt of court. And if the government is wrongly persecuting you, it is lose / lose if you divulge.

    • Do you think this is for fighting parking tickets? It is for journalists to not reveal their sources, whom might be at risk of severe consequences including death.

      That's a whole lot more to loose than your money and time.

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  • You're forgetting about the Constitution-Free Zone within 100 miles of all points of entry including international airports that covers essentially all of the 48.

    • This is a misunderstanding. That's the area in which the border patrol has jurisdiction to can conduct very limited searches of vehicles and operate checkpoints without individualized suspicion in order to enforce immigration law. It does not allow searches of electronic devices.

      There is a separate border search exception at the point a person actually enters the country which does allow searches of electronic devices. US citizens entering the country may refuse to provide access without consequences beyond seizure of the device; non-citizens could face adverse immigration actions.

      To be clear, I do think all detentions and searches without individualized suspicion should be considered violations of the 4th amendment, but the phrase "constitution-free zone" is so broad as to be misleading.

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    • I am not. You can still assert your rights at border points. It is very inconvenient. I have done it. If you are returning from international travel there is little they can do. If you are trying to leave the country they can make that difficult to impossible. Otherwise your rights still apply.

  • > You cannot be forced to divulge the contents of your mind, including your pin or passwords.

    Biometric data doesn’t need the password.

    And good luck depending on the US constitution.

Why are you on a website for programmers and software developers if you arent a software developer and you know nothing of the subject?